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THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE OF CONFUSION IN 
TRADEMARK* 
ALFRED C. YEN** 
This Article argues that consumer confusion plays a pervasive 
and important role in our trademark system. This argument 
directly challenges well-established orthodoxy. Numerous 
Supreme Court opinions and leading academics take the position 
that trademark law exists to reduce consumer confusion as much 
as possible. Indeed, courts generally justify aggressive creation 
and enforcement of trademark rights on the ground that these 
rights reduce consumer confusion or its economic equivalent, 
consumer search costs. Unfortunately, this construction of 
trademark law rests on a fundamental misunderstanding about 
how consumer confusion, the trademark system, and the 
operation of markets relate to one another. In particular, 
trademark orthodoxy considers consumer confusion always 
harmful. Aggressive elimination of even modest confusion 
therefore improves our trademark system and, by extension, the 
operation of markets because such modest confusion hinders the 
ability of consumers to find the goods they want. Two 
observations expose the inaccuracy of this orthodoxy. First, 
trademark law frequently accepts, creates, and even promotes the 
very sort of modest confusion that trademark orthodoxy 
despises. The ubiquitous presence of this confusion suggests that 
consumers should find their preferences seriously disrupted, but 
consumers generally find the goods they prefer without undue 
difficulty. Accordingly, it appears that modest confusion does not 
disrupt markets as badly as trademark orthodoxy states. Second, 
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and more importantly, there is ample reason to think that low-
level, modest confusion actually helps consumers avoid 
confusion by teaching them to identify and distinguish 
trademarks more effectively. Indeed, consumer research suggests 
that exposure to confusion spurs consumers to develop and 
implement cognitive strategies that avoid confusion and that 
consumers become more and more adept at using these strategies 
over time. This shows that trademark theory should change to 
embrace, and even encourage, low levels of modest confusion in 
order to improve consumer abilities and, by extension, the 
operation of the trademark system itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, I argue that consumer confusion plays a pervasive 
and important role in the proper functioning of our trademark 
system. By doing so, I challenge the conventional view that trademark 
law exists to reduce consumer confusion (or, in economic terms, 
consumer search costs) as much as possible.1 Indeed, I contend that 
our trademark system will not operate well unless consumers 
regularly experience manageable amounts of confusion.2 Trademark 
theory should therefore be reformed to explicitly accept, and even 
encourage, the presence of modest confusion in our trademark 
system. 
The idea advanced here leads to subtle but meaningful change in 
the theoretical structure and interpretation of trademark law. Today, 
conventional trademark theory is animated by what I call the 
“eradicate confusion norm.” This norm stands on the premise that 
consumer confusion serves no constructive purpose in our trademark 
system. It is always a bad thing when consumers are confused, even 
slightly, and it is the purpose of trademark law to shield consumers 
 
 1. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“In 
principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, 
‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions’ . . . .” 
(quoting J. McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 2.01[2], at 2–3 (3d ed. 1994))); Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs . . . .”); 
Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 
(2004) (“The influence of [trademark theory based on the reduction of consumer 
confusion or search costs] is now nearly total. It has been adopted at the highest levels of 
American law. No alternative account of trademark doctrine currently exists.”); Robert C. 
Bird & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of Consumer Surveys in Trademark Infringement: 
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1013, 1018–19 (2012) 
(describing the purpose of trademark law as “protect[ing] the consumer from confusion” 
and “reducing consumer search costs”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks 
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 795 (2004) (describing 
trademark law as seeking to “minimize consumer search costs”); William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 
(1987) (“The value of a trademark is the saving in search costs made possible by the 
information or reputation that the trademark conveys.”); William McGeveran & Mark P. 
McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 254 (2013) 
(“[C]ourts tend to view confusion itself as the ill that trademark law seeks to cure and to 
assume that the optimal level of confusion is always zero.”); Mark McKenna, The 
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) 
(“It would be difficult to overstate the level of consensus among commentators that the 
goal of trademark law is—and always has been—to improve the quality of information in 
the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer search costs.”). 
 2. See infra Part III. 
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from such confusion.3 Accordingly, trademark law should try to 
eradicate consumer confusion whenever possible, unless doing so 
would lead to unwanted side effects like the unintended 
monopolization of product features4 or burdensome restrictions on 
the ability of people to accurately describe various goods and 
services.5 
The eradicate confusion norm rests on a very specific 
understanding about consumer confusion, the operation of our 
trademark system, and the proper functioning of markets. Basic 
economic theory states that markets work best under conditions of 
perfect information.6 Ideally, consumers should instantly know 
everything about goods for sale so they can immediately buy the 
 
 3. Mark McKenna offers a clear description of what I have chosen to call “the 
eradicate confusion norm” in his article, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of 
Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 69–70 (2012). He notes that, under the dominant 
conceptual model of trademark, “trademark law’s job is to rid the marketplace of any and 
all confusion.” Id. Later, after recognizing that some kinds of confusion are beyond the 
reach of trademark law (such as where someone has left his keys), he describes how courts 
have continually justified expansive trademark rulings in confusion and search cost terms. 
Id. at 70. Accordingly, “[a]nything that can be characterized in confusion-based terms 
seems to raise search costs, and if search costs are the harm to be avoided, then anything 
that causes confusion ought to be at least prima facie actionable.” Id. at 71. 
 4. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) 
(explaining the functionality doctrine, denying trademark protection if trade dress is 
“essential to the use or purpose of the device” or “affects the cost or quality of the 
device”). 
 5. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118 
(2004) (documenting that the fair use defense protects a defendant’s ability to fairly 
describe its own products even if some confusion results); New Kids on the Block v. News 
Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (documenting that the nominative fair use 
defense protects a defendant’s ability to use a plaintiff’s trademark to identify the plaintiff 
or its product). 
 6. See ROBERT J. CARBAUGH, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS: AN APPLICATIONS 
APPROACH 188 (6th ed. 2010) (stating that inadequate information can cause market 
failure); ROBERT ERNEST HALL & MARC LIEBERMAN, MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES 
AND APPLICATIONS 252 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing how, in perfectly competitive markets, 
buyers have access to all relevant information); RICHARD G. LIPSEY & COLIN HARBURY, 
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 154 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that perfect information is an 
assumption of perfectly competitive markets); N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS 489–90 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing how information asymmetries are 
significant sources of market failure); LIBBY RITTENBERG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 
226 (2009) (stating that perfect competition presumes buyers have complete information 
about the market); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law 
Through Trademark Use, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1345, 1377 (2008) (“[B]asic market 
economics tells us that transparent markets with perfect information will bring about 
[efficient markets].”). 
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items that best fit their needs.7 Trademarks help create this ideal state 
of affairs by acting as words or symbols that capture a wide range of 
information about a product and its producer. Consumers who see a 
product’s mark therefore quickly learn a great deal about the 
product’s quality.8 
According to the convention behind the eradicate confusion 
norm, society needs trademark law to prevent the damage that 
markets suffer when conflicting or inaccurate meanings get associated 
with marks.9 This harm arises in two distinct ways. First, consumers 
could become mistaken about the meaning of a mark. This happens 
when rival producers use identical marks on competing goods. In 
these cases, consumers cannot accurately identify the producer of 
particular goods, and this can lead to mistaken purchases from the 
wrong source. Second, consumers who confront conflicting or 
inaccurate meanings may be able to figure out the correct meaning, 
but the market’s operation would still be compromised because 
consumers must spend time and effort resolving ambiguities and 
errors. These search costs impede the satisfaction of consumer 
preferences.10 Trademark law addresses these problems by preventing 
 
 7. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting 
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1250 (2007) (“Economists have 
long recognized that the goal of facilitating the free exchange of goods requires consumers 
to be able to find what they are looking for quickly and cheaply. Reducing consumer 
search costs, in turn, is the primary traditional justification—and still the best one—for 
having trademark law.”). 
 8. Bird & Steckel, supra note 1, at 1019 (“A consumer can look to trademarks as 
shorthand indicators of quality, prestige, or product attributes.”); Dogan & Lemley, supra 
note 1, at 787 (“Rather than having to inquire into the provenance and qualities of every 
potential purchase, consumers can look to trademarks as shorthand indicators.”). 
 9. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (stating that 
trademark law reduces consumer search costs because it “quickly and easily assures a 
potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer 
as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past”); Ty Inc. v. 
Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental purpose of a trademark is 
to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the 
particular source of particular goods.”). 
 10. See Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, Consumer 
Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 109 (2004) 
(describing how temporary initial confusion can increase consumer search costs); Ariel 
Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks, 2010 B.U. 
L. REV. 1555, 1580–87 (2010) (discussing the search costs associated with multiple 
meanings for trademarks); Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 761, 807 (2013) (describing how even momentary confusion can increase consumer 
search costs); see also Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511 (explaining trademark dilution by noting 
that consumers will have to “think harder” when confronting multiple meanings for 
trademarks, creating a higher “imagination cost”). 
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behavior that leads to confusion, broadly defined, about the meaning 
of marks. Because perfect information leads to the proper functioning 
of markets, shielding consumers from any doubt or delay about the 
meaning of a mark presumably helps markets work better.11 It 
therefore makes sense to eradicate consumer confusion whenever 
possible.12 
The eradicate confusion norm exerts great influence over 
contemporary trademark law. Courts and theorists alike constantly 
state that the purpose of trademark law is the reduction of consumer 
search costs, a term synonymous with reducing consumer confusion.13 
More importantly, the eradicate confusion norm provides vital 
support for an expansive, but often controversial, interpretation of 
trademark rights.14 On the one hand, some judges allow trademark 
 
  Some actions involving ambiguous meanings for trademarks may be 
simultaneously characterized as traditional trademark infringement that depends on the 
existence of confusion and trademark dilution that does not depend on confusion. J. 
MCCARTHY, 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:72 (4th 
ed.) (describing dilution as a distinct action not dependent on consumer confusion). There 
is considerable scholarly debate about whether trademark dilution, particularly blurring, is 
merely a specific form of trademark infringement actually based on confusion. See id. at 
nn.15–16. Even if dilution is correctly understood as distinct from traditional trademark 
infringement, it is important to note that traditional infringement and dilution actions are 
generally asserted together on the same facts. As Glynn Lunney writes,  
In virtually all of the cases, state and federal, that have been litigated since 
Massachusetts first adopted a dilution statute in 1947, the two causes of action, 
dilution and trademark infringement, are resolved identically. . . . Over the past 
sixty years, there are only a relative handful of cases where the two causes of 
action are resolved differently. 
GLYNN LUNNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK LAW 474 (2010). The near 
unity of results shared by dilution and traditional infringement make search-cost-based 
explanations of dilution fully applicable to many traditional infringement cases. 
 11. See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 827, 833 (2004) (“The orthodox justification for protecting trademarks is that 
trademarks enhance the efficient functioning of a competitive marketplace by ensuring 
that consumers can either find goods from the same source as goods they have enjoyed 
previously, or can find goods whose reputation has been advanced through advertising.”); 
Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 
(2010) (“When it works well, trademark law facilitates the workings of modern markets by 
permitting producers to accurately communicate information about the quality of their 
products to buyers . . . .”). 
 12. See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 1, at 254 (referring to judicial 
assumptions that trademark law should optimally eliminate confusion completely). 
 13. See supra note 1. 
 14. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property 
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 907 (2007) (stating that courts’ broad interpretations of confusion 
cause trademark users to become progressively more risk averse, influencing the very 
consumer norms courts incorporate into infringement analysis); Katz, supra note 10, at 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2014) 
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holders to prevent only confusion that causes consumers to 
mistakenly purchase one producer’s goods in favor of another’s 
goods.15 On the other hand, modern courts generally allow trademark 
holders to prevent modest or speculative confusion that is unlikely to 
result in mistaken purchases.16 For example, it is apparently 
trademark infringement to use the title “Dairy Queens” for a satirical 
movie about beauty pageants in rural Minnesota because it makes 
consumers think of the Dairy Queen restaurant chain,17 and it is also 
infringement for a travel company to entitle itself “G.A.P. 
Adventures” (an acronym for “great adventure people”) because that 
name will trigger memories of the GAP clothing company.18 These 
decisions get criticized as misapplications of trademark law,19 but they 
continue to flourish, and even multiply,20 because the eradicate 
 
1587 (“[T]he focus on minimizing search costs as the sole purpose of trademark law 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that the first adopter of any trademark should be given 
an exclusive right to it regardless of context, because any additional use might increase 
someone’s search cost.”); McKenna, supra note 1, at 1899 (“[M]odern trademark law 
essentially instantiates a one-way ratchet to broader trademark rights.”); Michael S. 
Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of Values and Interests 
in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427, 428–30 (2011) (describing the “enormous[]” 
expansion of trademark law). 
 15. For the seminal citation for this proposition, see Borden Ice Cream Co. v. 
Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912), which held that the 
defendant did not infringe the Borden mark owned by the plaintiff because condensed 
milk and ice cream sales do not substitute for one another. For further examples of 
instances in which courts held that products would not cause consumers to mistakenly 
purchase the wrong product, see infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 73–109 and accompanying text. 
 17. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732–35 (D. 
Minn. 1998). 
 18. The GAP, Inc. v. G.A.P. Adventures, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 9614(AKH), 2011 WL 
2946384, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2011). 
 19. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 11, at 860–61 (questioning whether the public truly 
benefits from constructions of consumer behavior that result in enlarged trademark 
rights); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 761–93 (2004) 
(arguing that courts make inappropriate assumptions about how easily consumers will be 
confused, leading to the expansion of trademark rights in ways that do not benefit 
consumers); Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademark, 88 N.C. L. REV. 
427, 439–42 (2010) (questioning decisions that expand the scope of copyright by portraying 
consumers as easily fooled); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 11, at 426–27 (criticizing 
cases that expand the scope of trademark infringement); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark 
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 417 (1999) (criticizing expanded “property-based” 
theories of trademarks as detached from trademarks’ traditional and sensible focus); 
Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark 
Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 121–22 (2005) (criticizing development and expansion of 
initial interest confusion). 
 20. See Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen Corp. of Am., 457 F.3d 1062, 1075 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant who made keychains bearing the logo of 
plaintiff Volkswagen committed infringement despite including disclaimers denying any 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2014) 
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confusion norm powerfully connects the elimination of even minor 
consumer confusion to the generally accepted purpose of trademark 
law.21 
I believe that the eradicate confusion norm fundamentally 
misunderstands the relationship between confusion and the operation 
of our trademark system. I also believe that it is a mistake to treat 
consumer confusion as something that must be eliminated in order to 
properly support commercial markets. My skepticism arises from two 
sources. 
First, despite conventional trademark theory’s supposed zeal for 
eliminating consumer confusion, the law itself frequently accepts, 
creates, and even welcomes consumer confusion.22 In some cases, 
confusion arises because trademark law concerns itself with facts that 
can exist only after consumers have faced confusion.23 At other times, 
confusion occurs because the very process of creating, assigning, and 
enforcing trademark rights opens the door to confusion.24 At still 
other times, trademark law explicitly accepts some degree of 
consumer confusion.25 If the conventional understanding about 
confusion were indeed correct, such ubiquitous confusion should 
seriously disrupt consumer markets. Of course, such disruption does 
not occur. Consumers generally find the goods they want, and this 
implies that some level of confusion does not compromise the 
operation of markets as trademark convention holds. 
 
connection with Volkswagen); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 191 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that the estate of Elvis Presley had a trademark violation claim against 
proprietors of an establishment called “The Velvet Elvis”); Lettuce Entertain You 
Enters., Inc. v. Leila Sophia AR, L.L.C., 703 F. Supp. 2d 777, 781 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding 
that the plaintiff, Lettuce Entertain You Enterprises, Inc., should be granted a preliminary 
injunction against a defendant operating restaurant under the name “Lettuce Mix” despite 
the fact that the plaintiff operated no restaurants using the word “lettuce” in the names); 
Toho Co. v. William Morrow and Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding 
that the maker of Godzilla movies and merchandise had a trademark violation claim 
against a publisher for titling a book “Godzilla!”); Nailtiques Cosmetics Corp. v. Salon Sci. 
Corp., No. 96-2709-DIV-NESBITT, 1997 WL 244746, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 1997) 
(holding that the plaintiff, seller of “Nailtiques” fingernail care products, should be 
granted an injunction against the defendant for selling “Pro-Techniques” fingernail care 
products). 
 21. See McKenna, supra note 3, at 79 (suggesting that the connection between search 
costs theory and consumer confusion has “manifested itself primarily in courts[] fetishizing 
confusion and feeling compelled to respond whenever mark owners can characterize a 
defendant’s use in confusion-based terms”). 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See infra notes 116–33 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 134–88 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra Part II.C. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2014) 
2014] CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK 85 
Second, there is ample reason to believe that modest levels of 
confusion actually help consumers develop cognitive skills that avoid 
confusion in ways that, in at least some instances, improve the 
operation of our trademark system. Remember, trademark law’s very 
focus on consumer confusion implies that consumers have cognitive 
skills that make it possible to identify and distinguish trademarks.26 
Furthermore, although these skills may be based on inherent, hard-
wired neurological characteristics of the human brain, it is important 
to understand that they do not arise in a vacuum divorced from 
trademark law. Instead, they develop precisely because consumers 
encounter confusion and learn how to deal with it. 
To use a metaphor with which we are all familiar, people are not 
born knowing how to read. Once people learn how to read basic 
works, they become more able readers by encountering and adapting 
to the challenges presented by more complicated texts. These 
complicated texts initially confuse readers, but readers adapt by 
developing skills that make comprehension possible. Over time, this 
process gives readers the ability to understand subtle and nuanced 
messages embedded in complicated texts.27 This ability could not exist 
without the struggles inherent in learning how to handle sophisticated 
“confusing” texts, and—more importantly—this ability is vital to the 
existence and maintenance of effective written communication. 
Without this process, the vast majority of people would have only 
low-level reading skills, and many sophisticated, complicated texts 
would lose social value because people would not be able to 
understand them. Indeed, most people would find those texts 
confusing. 
Things are no different for trademarks. Trademarks often take 
the form of written texts, and consumers surely are not born knowing 
what a trademark is. Consumers therefore develop the ability to 
identify and distinguish trademarks by learning from life-long 
exposure to trademarks, whose existence and features trademark law 
prescribes.28 In effect, consumers learn to “read” trademarks by 
experience, and they get better and better at it with practice, which 
 
 26. If consumers did not have these skills, it would be pointless for the law to attempt 
to eliminate confusion because consumers who lack the ability to identify and distinguish 
trademarks are, by definition, always confused. Eliminating confusion can therefore 
happen only if consumers have enough cognitive skill to at least sometimes understand the 
trademarks they see. 
 27. See infra notes 265–66 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 216–69 and accompanying text. 
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includes encounters with confusing situations. This developed skill 
supports the operation of an effective trademark system.29 
For example, if there were no legal protection for trademarks, 
consumers would react to them cautiously because trademarks, at 
least as we know them, would not reliably indicate the source of 
goods since more than one producer could be using the mark. Of 
course, once trademark protection exists, only one producer can use a 
given mark, and it becomes a reliable source indicator. Consumers 
would experience this and adopt trademarks as proof of authenticity. 
Similarly, if trademark law permitted producers to use similar marks 
that are distinguishable with modest attention, consumers would learn 
to pay reasonable attention to the details of marks. By contrast, if 
producers were legally required to use marks that bear no 
resemblance to each other, consumers would learn that the details of 
marks are unimportant and behave accordingly. 
Once we recognize that consumers respond to trademark law, it 
becomes possible to understand why exposing consumers to 
confusion does not necessarily harm the trademark system. To the 
contrary, some degree of confusion is valuable—and even 
necessary—because it teaches consumers to identify and distinguish 
trademarks. This is important because consumers who improve these 
skills become less easily confused about the meaning of trademarks. 
Even better, those consumers generally develop a sophisticated 
understanding of trademarks that enables the trademark system to 
convey better information to consumers through the equivalent of 
sophisticated texts. In short, we should not theorize trademark law as 
a shield that protects consumers from all instances of confusion. 
Instead, we should think of trademark law as a tool for managing 
confusion in ways that help consumers develop the cognitive skills 
necessary to support a complex market economy. It makes good sense 
for trademark law to prevent confusion when the confusion is so 
serious that consumers probably will not straighten things out on their 
own. In situations like this, meaningful disruption to markets is 
relatively likely, and this disruption will probably outweigh the 
benefits of any increase in consumers’ cognitive skills that results 
from exposure to confusion. By contrast, it makes little sense for 
trademark law to intervene when consumers face minor confusion 
that they likely will resolve on their own. In these situations, the 
 
 29. See Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First 
Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 654–55 (2009) (arguing that 
trademarks rely on the consumer’s “associational dexterity” to work). 
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likelihood of meaningful disruption to markets is low, so society will 
probably gain overall by tolerating minor confusion in exchange for 
the benefits that arise from consumers’ exposure to confusion. 
Unfortunately, modern trademark convention discourages 
thinking about trademark law this way because it relies so heavily on 
the eradicate confusion norm.30 Judicial opinions occasionally 
recognize that trademark decisions can shape consumer expectations 
over the long run,31 but this has led to neither a systematic description 
of how consumer confusion in trademark affects consumers nor open 
consideration of how confusion can affect consumer behavior in 
socially beneficial ways. Instead, courts have frequently acted to 
eliminate rather modest instances of confusion on the understandable 
but mistaken premise that complete eradication of consumer 
confusion serves the public interest.32 These instances of confusion 
are often precisely the ones that would otherwise teach consumers to 
become more sophisticated users of trademarks. 
In the pages that follow, I will describe how confusion educates 
consumers about trademarks and how modest confusion supports the 
operation of our trademark system. Part I describes trademark’s 
conventional emphasis on the immediate elimination of consumer 
confusion. Part II shows that trademark law frequently permits and 
even embraces consumer confusion. Borrowing insights from research 
about consumer learning, Part III analyzes how the confusion 
identified in Part II affects consumers.33 Part IV discusses how the 
 
 30. A few commentators have recognized the possibility that confusion may benefit 
the trademark system or that trademark can alter consumer behavior. They have not, 
however, pursued the implications of this realization in more than a preliminary way. See 
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 11, at 438–39 (noting the danger that “coddling 
consumers” may make them even more prone to confusion); McGeveran & McKenna, 
supra note 1, at 254 (recognizing that a small amount of confusion may lead to increased 
consumer understanding). 
 31. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1509 
(10th Cir. 1995) (“[C]onsumer confusion resulting from the copying of product features is, 
in some measure, a self-fulfilling prophecy. To the degree that useful product 
configurations are protected as identifiers, consumers will come to rely on them for that 
purpose, but if copying is allowed, they will depend less on product shapes and more on 
labels and packaging.”). 
 32. See infra Part II.B. 
 33. Other articles have used research about consumers to shed light on our trademark 
system, albeit for reasons other than exploring how consumers learn from confusion. See, 
e.g., Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary 
Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion, and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1014 
(2001) (applying knowledge borrowed from cognitive psychology and consumer research 
to various trademark-law doctrines); Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric C. 
DeRosia, Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and The Sophisticated Consumer, 57 
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beneficial effects of confusion imply that trademark should change its 
focus from simply eliminating confusion to managing confusion in 
ways that help consumers develop the skills they need to navigate 
modern marketplaces effectively. 
I.  THE ROLE AND EFFECT OF THE ERADICATE CONFUSION NORM 
Our inquiry begins by describing how the eradicate confusion 
norm and its associated understandings influence modern trademark 
law. As this Part shows, the norm and its emphasis on shielding 
consumers both describe and justify important and sometimes 
controversial expansions of modern trademark rights. First, I will 
describe how courts use the eradicate confusion norm to extend the 
scope of trademark’s subject matter well beyond what is necessary to 
permit the accurate identification of goods. Second, I will show how 
the norm identifies a form of actionable confusion that supports the 
imposition of trademark liability even when consumers are not 
confused about the source of goods they buy. In both of these areas, 
the argument is the same: trademark rights must be broad because 
the law should, per the eradicate confusion norm, wipe out all 
possibility of even fleeting consumer confusion. 
A. Subject Matter 
Although the law grants trademark protection to words, logos, 
and even product features that producers use to identify and 
distinguish their products,34 producers do not get rights to every mark 
they propose.35 Because trademark protection rests on a mark’s 
 
EMORY L.J. 575, 620–22 (2008) (using research about consumers to analyze judicial 
interpretation of consumer sophistication in the context of trademark infringement); Mark 
P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 
114–15 (2009) (using marketing studies to support the argument that lower-quality brand 
extensions do not generally harm the core brand’s reputation); Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing 
Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1253 (2011) (using consumer research to argue that 
branding alters how consumers evaluate product information and consumption 
experiences); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive 
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 510–11 (2008) (using consumer research to criticize broad 
dilution protection). 
 34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and 
distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate 
the source of the goods . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 
(1995) (“A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, or a 
combination of such designations, that is distinctive of a person’s goods or services 
and . . . distinguishes them from the goods or services of others.”). 
 35. See infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text. 
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ability to identify and distinguish one producer’s goods from 
another’s, a mark does not receive protection unless it identifies a 
particular source for a good or, in trademark parlance, is 
“distinctive.”36 Some proposed marks are automatically protected as 
“inherently distinctive” because their “intrinsic nature[s] serve[] to 
identify a particular source of a product.”37 Inherently distinctive 
marks include word marks that are “ ‘arbitrary’ (‘Camel’ cigarettes), 
‘fanciful’ (‘Kodak’ film), or ‘suggestive’ (‘Tide’ laundry detergent),”38 
as well as logos and packaging.39 
By contrast, some other proposed marks do not receive 
automatic protection because it is unclear whether they actually 
identify a source.40 However, these marks will receive protection if the 
user of the mark can establish distinctiveness.41 For example, a 
clothing manufacturer may decide to market a line of “Safari” 
clothing.42 Consumers could identify that clothing as the type worn by 
people on safaris,43 or they could identify it as clothing coming from a 
specific manufacturer.44 Similarly, a shoe manufacturer may decide to 
use a specific color in the design of its shoe.45 Consumers might buy 
 
 36. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (“The general 
rule regarding distinctiveness is clear: An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of 
being protected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness 
through secondary meaning.”). 
 37. Id. at 768; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) 
(citing and quoting Two Pesos with approval). 
 38. See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 210–11 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. 
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10–11 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
 39. See id. at 209, 212 (noting that the Nike swoosh can be registered as a trademark 
and explaining that product packaging is often inherently distinctive); Star Indus., Inc. v. 
Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 383 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding the plaintiff’s Star “O” design 
logo to be inherently distinctive). 
 40. See Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(finding no reason to extend trademark protection to marks that lack the ability to identify 
a source). 
 41. See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211 (explaining how marks lacking inherent 
distinctiveness can still gain protection). 
 42. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(stating that the plaintiff used the mark “Safari” on various clothing and shoes). 
 43. See id. at 8 (describing the lower court’s finding that the plaintiff’s use of “Safari” 
was “merely descriptive”). 
 44. See id. at 13–14 (holding that “Safari” is not merely descriptive when used on 
some items, including shoes, and therefore eligible for trademark protection). 
 45. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 
206, 211 (2d Cir. 2012) (describing how the plaintiff painted the outsole of its shoes in a 
particular shade of red). 
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the shoe because they find the color attractive,46 or they might do so 
because it signifies the manufacturer.47 In cases like this, trademark 
protection exists only upon a showing that consumers have come to 
understand the proposed mark as a source identifier.48 Marks for 
which such a showing has been made are sometimes said to exhibit 
“acquired distinctiveness.”49 
The wisdom of allowing acquired distinctiveness to establish 
trademark protection is far from obvious because trademark 
protection for marks that lack inherent distinctiveness can harm free 
market competition. If one clothing maker successfully monopolizes 
the use of “Safari” to describe clothing, rivals producing similar 
clothes will lose the ability to fairly describe their goods. And, to the 
extent that only one shoemaker can use red on the soles of its shoes, 
others may find it difficult to offer a competing product for sale at all. 
This would ultimately harm consumers because the trademark holder 
would leverage its trademark rights into a monopoly over red-soled 
shoes.50 
These problems suggest that trademark law ought to protect only 
inherently distinctive marks.51 If the law did this, then producers who 
care about the benefits of trademark protection would use only 
inherently distinctive marks. Consumers would find it easy to identify 
new marks, and the anti-competitive effects outlined above would 
disappear. 
Concerns about free competition do lead to a few limits on the 
scope of trademark’s subject matter. Trademark law will not protect a 
 
 46. See id. at 222 (noting that ornamental features are not protected as trademarks 
when consumers desire the feature and granting exclusive rights would unduly hinder 
competition). 
 47. See id. at 226–27 (stating that consumers associate red-soled shoes with the 
plaintiff). 
 48. See id. at 225–26 (holding that painting the soles of shoes red could be protected 
as a trademark if consumers understood that feature as an indicator of source); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(b) (1995) (noting that a mark can 
become distinctive if consumers understand it as a source identifier); infra notes 55–67 and 
accompanying text (allowing trademark protection for color based on proof that it had 
become a source identifier). 
 49. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (explaining 
that marks that gain acquired distinctiveness are protected); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. 
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (offering the same explanation provided by 
the Court in Wal-Mart Stores). 
 50. See Lunney, supra note 19, at 421–31 (describing the welfare consequences of 
monopolies associated with trademark law). 
 51. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168 (1995) (recognizing but 
rejecting the argument against granting protection to marks lacking inherent 
distinctiveness). 
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word mark when competitors genuinely need to use a word to 
describe their products.52 Similarly, it will not protect a product 
feature as a mark when the feature is functional and therefore 
essential to product quality.53 On the whole, however, trademark law 
generally looks past competition-related concerns and grants 
protection quite freely upon showings of acquired distinctiveness 
because courts believe that doing so protects consumers from 
confusion.54 
The Supreme Court provided a clear example of such reasoning 
in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co.,55 a case in which the Court 
considered whether trademark law protects color.56 The Qualitex facts 
were entirely typical. For forty years, the plaintiff, Qualitex, had used 
a particular shade of green-gold on its dry-cleaning press pads.57 
When the defendant, Jacobsen, began selling pads in a similar color, 
Qualitex sued for trademark infringement.58 Qualitex prevailed in the 
district court, but the Ninth Circuit ruled in Jacobsen’s favor on the 
grounds that color alone was ineligible for trademark protection.59 
Qualitex appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
there is no rule barring trademark protection for a color.60 
 
 52. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938) (holding that 
“shredded wheat” is a generic term as applied to cereal and cannot be protected because it 
is “the term by which [the cereal] is generally known by the public”); Boston Duck Tours, 
L.P. v. Super Duck Tours, L.L.C., 531 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that the phrase 
“duck tour” was generic for sight-seeing tours using an amphibious vehicle); Harley 
Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that Harley 
Davidson had no exclusive right to the term “hog” when used to describe large 
motorcycles); Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the maker of Honey-Brown Ale could not stop other beer producers from 
using the term “honey-brown” to describe their ales); Classic Foods Int’l Corp. v. Kettle 
Foods, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1182–83 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that the maker of 
Kettle Chips could not prohibit other chip producers from using “kettle” to describe chips 
that have been or appear to have been cooked in a kettle); MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 
§ 12:1 (noting that a generic name of a product cannot serve as a mark). 
 53. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (finding that a product feature is functional and 
cannot be protected if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or affects the cost 
or quality of the article); see also Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 
32–34 (2001) (applying Qualitex to find a dual-spring design mechanism on temporary 
road and outdoor signs to be functional); MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 7:63 (noting that 
when a product feature is utilitarian, or functional, it will not be protected). 
 54. See infra notes 55–68 and accompanying text. 
 55. 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
 56. Id. at 160–61. 
 57. Id. at 161. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 161–62. 
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In so ruling, the Court considered and rejected the arguments 
against trademark protection for marks lacking inherent 
distinctiveness.61 Justice Breyer’s majority opinion recognized that 
consumers do not naturally treat color as a source identifier62 and that 
protecting colors could damage free competition because consumers 
sometimes want products in certain colors for reasons unrelated to 
source identification.63 Nevertheless, it implicitly embraced the 
eradicate confusion norm, stating that these concerns did not warrant 
categorically denying trademark protection to color because, 
according to the Court, doing so would permit consumer confusion.64 
If consumers had learned to use a color as a source identifier, denying 
trademark protection to that color would have the same effect as 
denying protection to an inherently distinctive mark.65 Either way, 
consumers would be confused, and trademark’s very purpose is to 
prevent that confusion.66 The Court therefore allowed trademark 
protection for color upon proof of acquired distinctiveness.67 
Numerous other courts have used similar reasoning to extend 
trademark protection to words and product features that lack 
inherent distinctiveness.68 Together, these cases show that 
 
 61. Id. at 162–69. 
 62. Id. at 162–63 (“[A] product’s color is unlike ‘fanciful,’ ‘arbitrary,’ or ‘suggestive’ 
words or designs, which almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand.” 
(quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–10 (2d Cir. 
1976))). 
 63. Id. at 165. 
 64. Id. at 163–66. 
 65. Id. at 163 (“[O]ver time, customers may come to treat a particular color on a 
product or its packaging . . . as signifying a brand. And, if so, that color would have come 
to identify and distinguish the goods—i.e., ‘to indicate’ their ‘source’—much in the way 
that descriptive words on a product . . . can come to indicate a product’s origin.”). 
 66. Id. at 163–64 (describing the basic purpose of trademark as reducing consumer 
search costs and finding the protection of color fully consistent with that purpose). 
 67. Id. at 164 (“It is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological 
status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign—that permits it to serve [trademark’s] basic 
purposes. And, for that reason, it is difficult to find, in basic trademark objectives, a reason 
to disqualify absolutely the use of a color as a mark.” (citation omitted)). 
 68. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. and Mech. Coll. v. Smack 
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 477–78 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the university’s color 
schemes acquired distinctiveness and were therefore protectable); Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 419–20 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the grill design for a 
vehicle had acquired distinctiveness and was therefore protectable); Ferrari S.P.A. v. 
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1239–40 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that the shape of cars had 
acquired distinctiveness and was therefore protectable); Schmidt v. Quigg, 609 F. Supp. 
227, 230–31 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding that “honey baked” had acquired distinctiveness 
and was therefore protectable when used as mark on ham); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211–12 (2000) (citing Qualitex with approval and holding 
that product design is protectable upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness). 
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conventional trademark theory and the eradicate confusion norm 
support protection for a broad range of marks for the stated purpose 
of shielding consumers from as much confusion as possible. 
B. Basic Trademark Infringement 
Trademark infringement exists when a defendant’s behavior 
creates a “likelihood of consumer confusion.”69 As one might 
imagine, the precise meaning of confusion is unclear and contested. 
At one end of the spectrum, it has been held that infringing confusion 
exists only when consumers might mistakenly buy the defendant’s 
products instead of the plaintiff’s.70 At the other end of the spectrum, 
many courts have held that infringing confusion can exist even when 
there is no meaningful risk of a mistaken purchase.71 Instead, a 
plaintiff can establish infringement by showing only that more than 
one association for a mark enters a consumer’s mind.72 
To appreciate the difference between these understandings of 
confusion and the role of the eradicate confusion norm, let us begin 
with Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co.73 In that case, the 
plaintiff Aunt Jemima sold self-rising flour under the mark “Aunt 
Jemima’s,” and the defendant Rigney sold pancake syrup and sugar 
cream under the identical mark.74 When negotiations about the 
possible joint use of the mark to sell pancake flour apparently 
 
 69. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (imposing liability on those using a mark in a 
manner “likely to cause confusion” about the source or sponsorship of goods); Two Pesos, 
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (“It is, of course, also undisputed that 
[trademark or trade dress liability] requires proof of the likelihood of confusion.”); 
Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a plaintiff must prove likelihood of confusion to prevail in a 
trademark infringement case); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 
(1995) (imposing liability on a trademark defendant whose use of a mark causes a 
“likelihood of confusion”). 
 70. See Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 513–14 
(7th Cir. 1912) (holding that the defendant’s use of the “Borden” mark to sell ice cream 
did not infringe on the plaintiff’s use of the “Borden” mark to sell condensed milk because 
the two products were not substitutes for one another, and therefore consumers could not 
mistakenly buy the defendant’s goods instead of the plaintiff’s). 
 71. See Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 410–12 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 72. See infra notes 78–111 and accompanying text; see also Gerhardt, supra note 19, at 
439–42 (describing cases where courts supported questionable findings of infringement by 
portraying consumers as easily fooled); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 11, at 422–26 
(describing the narrow scope of trademark infringement in the early twentieth century and 
its subsequent expansion). 
 73. 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 74. Id. at 408. 
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foundered, Aunt Jemima sued Rigney for trademark infringement.75 
Although it is easy to imagine that consumers might have thought 
that the same manufacturer made pancake flour and syrup, the 
district court ruled against Aunt Jemima.76 The rationale for doing so 
reflected a very narrow understanding of consumer confusion, 
extending protection to plaintiffs only when a defendant’s use of a 
confusing mark directly diverted sales that the plaintiff would have 
otherwise enjoyed. This meant that the district court had to rule in 
favor of the defendant because sales of syrup and sugar cream do not 
replace sales of flour.77 The Second Circuit, however, reversed and 
found in Aunt Jemima’s favor.78 In so ruling, the court articulated 
reasons for broadening trademark’s scope. As an initial matter, the 
court objected to the defendant’s attempt “either to get the benefit of 
the complainant’s reputation or of its advertisement or to forestall the 
extension of its trade.”79 Additionally, the court noted that syrup and 
flour are commonly used together and that consumers could easily 
believe that syrup marketed under the Aunt Jemima’s mark was 
actually made by the plaintiff.80 
Two distinct interpretations of the Second Circuit’s Aunt Jemima 
decision exist. First, the court might simply have been recognizing 
that two manufacturers who do not presently compete might do so in 
the future. If such competition is reasonably foreseeable, then simple 
consumer uncertainty about the meaning of marks used by the 
manufacturers could easily turn into the mistaken substitutions 
considered actionable by the district court. Preventing this would 
represent a fairly straightforward extension of the district court’s 
guiding rationale. Second, the court might have been altering the 
meaning of consumer confusion by separating it from the risk of 
mistaken substitution. Note the court’s objection to the defendant 
getting “the benefit of the complainant’s reputation or of its 
advertisement or to forestall the extension of its trade,”81 something 
 
 75. See id. at 408–09. 
 76. Id. at 408. 
 77. Id. at 409 (noting the district court’s view that “no one wanting syrup could 
possibly be made to take flour”); see also Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed 
Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912) (holding that the defendant did not infringe the 
Borden mark owned by the plaintiff because condensed milk and ice cream sales did not 
substitute for one another). 
 78. Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 412 (reversing the district court and granting 
injunctive relief to the plaintiff). 
 79. Id. at 409. 
 80. Id. at 409–10. 
 81. See id. at 409. 
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apparently considered undesirable even though it carried no risk of 
substitution. 
It is of course impossible to know exactly what the Aunt Jemima 
court intended. Although some courts continue to anchor trademark 
infringement to some meaningful likelihood of consumer mistake 
about the source of goods,82 it is clear that modern courts have 
generally followed the second understanding of Aunt Jemima and 
have found trademark infringement even when there is little risk of 
confusion about the maker of the goods.83 
For example, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.,84 
the plaintiff, Mobil Oil, made wide use of its red-flying-horse mark in 
conjunction with a wide range of petroleum products and services.85 
Mobil sued the defendant, Pegasus Petroleum, contending that the 
use of “Pegasus” in conjunction with the defendant’s oil trading 
business infringed the flying-horse mark.86 The Second Circuit agreed, 
finding that the defendant’s use of “Pegasus” created a likelihood of 
confusion.87 In this case, the possibility of mistaken purchases from 
Pegasus was effectively nonexistent. As the Second Circuit noted, 
Pegasus Petroleum restricted its business to oil trading, never selling 
to ordinary consumers.88 Since oil traders are relatively sophisticated 
buyers who know the players in their industry,89 it was highly unlikely 
that anyone would ever buy oil from Pegasus Petroleum under the 
mistaken belief that she was doing business with Mobil Oil. The 
Second Circuit understood this, and it made no serious claim that 
 
 82. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel L.L.C., 293 F.3d 550, 555 (2d Cir. 
2002) (holding that there was no likelihood of confusion between New York $lot 
Exchange slot machine games in casinos and the New York Stock Exchange); Nabisco, 
Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 43 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that Dentyne Ice was 
not likely to cause confusion with Ice Breakers breath-freshening gum); Estee Lauder, Inc. 
v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1505 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Gap’s 100% Body Care 
line of products was not likely to cause confusion with Estee Lauder’s 100% high 
technology facial moisturizer); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 973 F.2d 
1033, 1033 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that there was no likelihood of confusion between 
Excedrin PM and Tylenol PM, despite similar trade dress); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. 
v. Nature Labs, L.L.C., 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that Timmy 
Holedigger dog perfume was not likely to cause confusion with the Tommy Hilfiger 
mark); see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 11, at 427 (arguing for limiting actionable 
confusion to cases involving consumer error about facts material to purchasing decisions). 
 83. Gerhardt, supra note 19, at 439–40. 
 84. 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 85. Id. at 255. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 260. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
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Pegasus Petroleum’s behavior would divert any sales from Mobil. 
Instead, the court found a likelihood of confusion because Pegasus 
Petroleum’s mark would remind people of Mobil,90 giving Pegasus 
commercial credibility not because oil traders believed that Pegasus 
was formally affiliated with Mobil, but because there was a possibility 
of such association that purchasers would have to consider briefly and 
dismiss.91 
Similarly, in Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co.,92 the 
plaintiff, Beer Nuts, sold mixed nuts under the name “Beer Nuts,”93 
and it sued the defendant, Clover Club, for selling its own mixed nuts 
under the name “Brew Nuts.”94 Because “Beer Nuts” differs from 
“Brew Nuts,” one could easily imagine a court finding that Clover 
Club caused no likelihood of confusion, and the district court so 
found.95 However, the Tenth Circuit reversed.96 The circuit court 
acknowledged that clear differences between the two marks existed.97 
Nevertheless, the court stated that the general similarities mattered 
more than these differences.98 Among other things, the words “beer” 
and “brew” both contained four letters, began with “b,” and were 
synonyms for beer.99 According to the court, a likelihood of confusion 
was particularly likely because consumers were unlikely to pay 
attention to small differences like these when buying nuts.100 
Beer Nuts is hard to understand if liability rested on a reasonable 
probability that consumers would buy Brew Nuts thinking that they 
would be doing business with Beer Nuts. Although portions of the 
opinion claim (rather unconvincingly) that consumers would make 
this very mistake,101 it is unlikely that consumers truly could not 
distinguish Beer Nuts from Brew Nuts. Beer Nuts makes much more 
sense, however, if emphasis is given to the portions of the opinion 
suggesting that Brew Nuts became associated with Beer Nuts because 
 
 90. Id. at 257 (quoting with approval the district court’s statement that “the word 
‘Pegasus’ evokes the symbol of the flying horse”). 
 91. Id. at 259. 
 92. 805 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 93. Id. at 922. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 923. Indeed, the district court found no likelihood of confusion on two 
separate occasions. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 926. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 926–27 (“[T]he district court should have concluded that the two products 
are purchased with little care and are thus likely to be confused.”). 
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both are mixed nuts that go with beer. As the court noted, the mark 
“Beer Nuts” tied one producer’s mixed nuts to beer.102 Accordingly, 
when Clover Club used the mark “Brew Nuts,” it also associated its 
nuts with beer and raised the possibility that consumers would think 
of Beer Nuts upon encountering Brew Nuts.103 This created the risk 
that some of Beer Nuts’ reputation would “rub off” on Brew Nuts 
even though consumers knew that the two were distinct products 
made by different manufacturers. 
Finally, in American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line 
Productions, Inc.,104 a Minnesota district court found a likelihood of 
confusion when the Dairy Queen fast food chain sued the producer of 
a movie entitled “Dairy Queens,” which satirized beauty pageants 
held in rural Minnesota.105 Some of the satire involved off-color 
humor.106 If the court believed that trademark law only protects 
against consumers mistakenly buying goods from the wrong producer, 
then liability would not have existed, for it is highly unlikely that 
moviegoers would see a movie entitled “Dairy Queens” thinking it 
was made by the Dairy Queen restaurant chain. However, if 
trademark’s concerns include the possibility that consumers will 
associate multiple meanings with a trademark, then liability makes 
sense. After all, the “Dairy Queens” title would probably remind 
many consumers of the restaurant chain. Those consumers would 
then simultaneously think of the movie, its satirical off-color content, 
the restaurant chain, and its food. This would force consumers to 
spend time and effort untangling all of these associations with “Dairy 
Queens” and “Dairy Queen” when going to see the movie or eat at 
the restaurant chain. Not surprisingly, the American Dairy Queen 
court expressed concern about the possibility of multiple 
associations.107 According to the court, “[American Dairy Queen] is 
particularly concerned that the title ‘Dairy Queens’ will cause the 
public to associate its trademarked name with the unwholesome 
content of the film. [American Dairy Queen] fears this association 
will create negative impressions and confuse its customers, thereby 
 
 102. Id. at 926. 
 103. See id. 
 104. 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998). 
 105. Id. at 729. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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demeaning and disparaging its mark.”108 This led to the court’s finding 
that a likelihood of confusion existed.109 
Cases like Pegasus Petroleum, Brew Nuts, and American Dairy 
Queen110 pose significant challenges to modern trademark law 
because, according to these cases, liability exists only when the 
defendant’s behavior creates a likelihood of consumer confusion.111 If 
modern trademark law were to restrict infringement to cases in which 
a reasonable chance of mistaken substitution exists, then it would be 
easy to see why consumer confusion exists and why preventing it 
makes sense. However, when infringement includes cases in which the 
risk of substitution is very small, the existence of confusion becomes 
questionable. If consumers do not make mistaken purchases, how 
have they been confused? And, if they have not been confused, why 
does trademark law impose liability? The eradicate confusion norm 
answers these questions. As the norm holds, markets work correctly 
when consumers can instantly identify the goods they want.112 
Whenever consumers even temporarily associate a trademark with 
something other than the trademark holder or its goods, the process 
of identification is disrupted.113 Such disruption compromises markets, 
and trademark law should therefore eradicate this confusion to help 
markets operate smoothly, even when there is no meaningful risk of 
mistaken consumer purchases.114 This conclusion implies that cases 
 
 108. Id. at 729. 
 109. Id. at 732. 
 110. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the grill of a toy car manufactured by the defendant was likely to cause 
confusion with General Motors’s Hummer grill mark); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. 
v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that in Debbie Does 
Dallas, a pornographic movie, the uniform worn resembled the Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders outfits and was likely to cause confusion); HMH Pub. Co. v. Brincat, 504 
F.2d 713, 720 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the defendant’s unincorporated automobile 
services business selling dune buggy parts and providing towing services under the Playboy 
name was likely to be confused with the famous pornography distributor); McDonald’s 
Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding 
that there could be confusion between the plaintiff’s McDonald’s restaurant and the 
defendant’s McDental dental services organization); John Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. Bethea, 
305 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (D.S.C. 1969) (holding that a Johnnie Walker motel was likely to 
cause confusion with the famous scotch purveyor of the same name). 
 111. See supra note 69. 
 112. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra note 3; see also Austin, supra note 11, at 896–98 (identifying how 
trademark law sometimes recognizes legal harm when a consumer merely considers the 
wrong brand without making a mistaken purchase); Deven R. Desai, Response: An 
Information Approach to Trademarks, 100 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2122 (2012) (arguing that the 
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like Pegasus Petroleum, Beer Nuts, and American Dairy Queen were 
all correctly decided. 
The eradicate confusion norm seemingly offers a theoretically 
coherent and powerful foundation for modern trademark law. There 
is a seductive elegance to the norm’s explanation of how even slight 
confusion harms the public interest, and it is easy to understand why 
courts and theorists place the elimination of consumer confusion at 
the center of modern trademark theory.115 It is therefore quite 
interesting and instructive to note that many areas of trademark law 
appear inconsistent with the eradicate confusion norm. As the next 
Part will discuss, those areas of trademark law accept and even 
encourage consumer confusion, and they often do so because such 
confusion advances the public interest. This contrast draws the 
descriptive and normative values of the eradicate confusion norm into 
question. 
II.  PERSISTENT AND INEVITABLE CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK 
The above-described aversion to consumer confusion implies 
that trademark law should prohibit even relatively small instances of 
confusion wherever possible. Curiously, however, trademark law does 
not consistently pursue this objective. Although courts have 
expanded the subject matter and scope of trademark rights for the 
stated purpose of eliminating consumer confusion, there are many 
instances in which the law accepts and even encourages the very 
confusion that trademark convention and the eradicate confusion 
norm find so odious. This happens in three ways. First, trademark 
decisions often depend on facts that exist only after consumers have 
faced confusion. Second, trademark law operates in ways that are 
almost certain to create consumer confusion. Third, courts sometimes 
explicitly decline opportunities to reduce confusion. I will now 
describe this persistent and, in some cases, inevitable confusion in 
trademark in order to question conventional wisdom about the role of 
confusion in our trademark system. 
 
trademark system now operates to maintain “a singular, consistent meaning” for every 
trademark). 
 115. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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A. Decisions Based on Facts That Exist Only After Consumer 
Confusion 
1.  Another Look at Acquired Distinctiveness 
In Part I, we saw that trademark law protects certain marks only 
after they acquire distinctiveness. The reason for this protection is 
simple. As Qualitex116 explained, failure to protect a mark after it 
gains distinctiveness would mean allowing consumers to be 
confused.117 This reasoning clearly establishes a strong connection 
between protecting marks that become distinctive and preventing 
consumer confusion.118 Interestingly, however, the very process of 
protecting marks that become distinctive also involves confusing 
consumers and having consumers overcome that confusion. Indeed, 
consumer confusion is a prerequisite to the protection of marks that 
acquire distinctiveness. 
A mark lacks inherent distinctiveness when consumers do not 
instantly recognize it as a source identifier. Consumers already give 
meanings other than source identification to proposed marks like 
“Safari” because the marks have well-settled meanings in the English 
language.119 A trademark claimant therefore cannot gain protection 
on the basis of acquired distinctiveness without changing the meaning 
of things already familiar to consumers. In turn, this change cannot 
happen without exposing consumers to confusion because consumers 
cannot give new meaning to a familiar item until they encounter the 
familiar item attached to its new meaning. That new meaning may 
eventually become sufficiently established to gain trademark 
protection, but consumers must first sort through the confusion of 
considering both meanings and deciding how to use both meanings. 
For example, the first time consumers encounter “Safari” shoes, 
they cannot know whether they are dealing with shoes designed for 
 
 116. 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
 117. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. Marks frequently lack 
distinctiveness because they describe characteristics of the goods themselves. Consumers 
therefore may think of these terms as basic information about goods for sale rather than 
their source. For example, trademarks like “All-Bran,” “Band-Aid,” or “Scholastic” did 
not refer to a specific company on the day they were introduced. See ALL-BRAN, 
Registration No. 0314238 (registration of “All Bran” for cereal); BAND-AID, 
Registration No. 0194123 (registration of “Band-Aid” for bandages); SCHOLASTIC, 
Registration No. 0273405 (registration of “Scholastic” for publications). The source 
identification meanings for these marks therefore appeared over time as consumers 
learned the new meanings.  
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safaris, or shoes made by a particular manufacturer, or even both. 
They may eventually learn that “Safari” designates a particular source 
for shoes, but not without experiencing and overcoming confusion. 
This process shows that trademark law, at least in this area, does not 
operate simply by shielding consumers from confusion. Rather, 
trademark law invites and encourages producers to expose consumers 
to confusion by holding out the promise of trademark protection if a 
producer can teach consumers to recognize familiar words or product 
features as source identifiers.120 
2.  Private-Label Goods 
A focus on facts that exist only after consumers have overcome 
confusion also exists in the case law concerning so-called private-label 
(also known as “store-brand”) goods.121 Retailers typically sell 
private-label products in packaging that resembles the packaging for 
name-brand goods, and the private-label products are typically sold 
immediately alongside name-brand goods.122 Undoubtedly, many 
readers have had the experience of shopping and mistakenly picking 
up or even buying a store-brand product instead of the desired name-
brand one. I surmise that many readers have further learned from 
that mistake and can now distinguish name-brand and store-brand 
products quite effectively. 
Not surprisingly, name-brand manufacturers object to the 
packaging practices of their private-label competitors, and they have 
often asserted claims for trademark infringement.123 When these cases 
 
 120. Although not central to the point being made here, consumers must overcome 
small amounts of confusion even in cases that involve arbitrary or fanciful marks that 
courts would consider inherently distinctive. For example, “Just Do It” has an ordinary 
English meaning other than as a source identifier for Nike. Nike therefore could not make 
effective use of this mark until they had educated consumers to learn the new meaning 
Nike had given the phrase. Similarly, Apple Computer had to teach consumers a new 
meaning for the sentence “I want an Apple.” The same could be said for many other 
famous marks like “Fidelity” (investment services), “Horizon” (cars), and “Colt” 
(firearms). 
 121. “Private-label” and “store-brand” are terms used to identify products made or 
sold by retailers as substitutes for similar products made by known, name-brand 
manufacturers. See Store-Brand Taste-Off, CONSUMER REP. MAG., Oct. 2012, at 16–17. 
 122. For example, the CVS Pharmacy generally sells its store-brand pain relievers next 
to name brands, such as Tylenol, Advil, and Motrin. See CVS/pharmacy Brand Shop, CVS, 
http://cvs.com/shop/brand-shop/C/CVSpharmacy/_/N-3qZ1a78jo (last visited Nov. 25, 
2014). 
 123. For lawsuits brought by brand-name trademark holders, see generally McNeil 
Nutritionals, L.L.C. v. Heartland Sweeteners, L.L.C., 511 F.3d 350, 353–54 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Oral-B Labs., Inc., 
v. Mi-Lor Corp., 810 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1986), superseded by Paddington Corp. v. Attiki 
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were first litigated, courts often decided them in favor of the name-
brand plaintiffs.124 After all, the private-label sellers deliberately 
chose similar packaging for directly competing goods, and the errors 
made by shoppers represented precisely the sort of confusion 
trademark is supposed to eliminate. 
Over time, however, courts have come to understand these cases 
differently. Instead of finding that private-label packaging confuses 
consumers, opinions now generally state that consumers are not 
confused because they have learned from prior experience to 
distinguish private-label goods from their name-brand referents.125 
For example, in Conopco, Inc. v. May Department Stores Company,126 
the Federal Circuit rejected a trademark claim against a private-label 
seller of hand lotion by writing as follows: 
The retailer packages its product in a manner to make it clear 
to the consumer that the product is similar to the national 
brand, and is intended for the same purposes. At the same time, 
the retailer clearly marks its product with its private logo, and 
expressly invites the consumer to compare its product with that 
of the national brand, by name. With the rise of regional and 
national discount retailers with established names and logos, 
retailers who market both national brands and their own 
private label brands in direct competition, this form of 
competition has become commonplace and well-known in the 
marketplace. When such packaging is clearly labelled [sic] and 
differentiated . . . we are unwilling to attribute to the Eighth 
Circuit, absent clear precedent so requiring, a rule that would 
make such competition presumptively unlawful.127 
Look carefully at the premise of this argument. By rejecting the 
plaintiff’s claim on the ground that consumers have become familiar 
with the practice of private-label packaging, Conopco focuses on facts 
that can exist only after consumers have encountered confusion.128 
 
Imps. & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1993); McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Guardian Drug 
Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Majestic Drug Co. v. Olla Beauty Supply, Inc., 
No. 97 Civ. 0046, 1997 WL 37955 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1997); Kroger Co. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 570 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
 124. See, e.g., Oral-B Labs., 810 F.2d at 21; McNeil-PPC, 984 F. Supp. at 1074; Majestic 
Drug Co., 1997 WL 37955, at *14; Kroger Co., 570 F. Supp. at 1061. 
 125. See McNeil Nutritionals, 511 F.3d at 353–54 (stating that customers were aware of 
private-label packaging and affirming denial of preliminary injunction in favor of all but 
one defendant); Conopco, 46 F.3d at 1570 (denying claim of trademark infringement). 
 126. 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 127. Id. at 1565 (emphasis added). 
 128. Id. 
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When private-label packaging was introduced, consumers certainly 
were confused because they were unfamiliar with the practice and did 
not pay attention to distinguishing characteristics that they now spot 
easily.129 Accordingly, if consumers are no longer confused, it is 
because they experienced and overcame confusion of the very sort 
that often supports a finding of trademark infringement. 
3.  Internet Domain Names 
A similar embrace of confusion exists in the case law concerning 
Internet domain names. As readers are surely aware, it is quite 
common for two websites to share domain names that associate them 
with a recognized mark. This similarity could easily confuse 
consumers about the true proprietor of the site. For example, the 
URL “www.buyorleasealexus.com” could belong to the Toyota 
Motor Company or any other party selling Lexus cars. A consumer 
who encounters this website surely experiences the kind of confusion 
that trademarks have eliminated in other cases. 
The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to find infringement on 
these very facts. In Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari,130 the 
court stated that consumers who use the Internet have become quite 
sophisticated about similar domain names and are fully prepared to 
discover that domain names do not always accurately identify the 
proprietor of a given website.131 This statement meant that consumers 
encountering “www.buyorleasealexus.com” would avoid premature 
conclusions about the website’s proprietor until more evidence 
became available. Importantly, the court did not consider this delay in 
accurate identification to be a form of confusion. Instead, the court 
called it “sensible agnosticism.”132 Other courts have reached similar 
results.133 
 
 129. See supra note 124 (identifying cases in which courts found consumers confused by 
private-label products). 
 130. 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 131. Id. at 1179. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 
1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that consumers may have once behaved carelessly with 
respect to Internet domain names, but they no longer do so); Chatam Int’l, Inc. v. Bodum, 
Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (explaining that internet surfers are 
accustomed to discovering that the domain name of a website may not accurately indicate 
its owner); Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (arguing 
that internet users “are ‘unlikely to be dissuaded, or unnerved’ when, after ‘tak[ing] a stab 
at what they think is the most likely domain name for a particular web site’ guess wrong 
and bring up another’s webpage); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 
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Here, as in the case of private labeling, trademark law has again 
focused on facts that can exist only after consumers have experienced 
and overcome confusion. A consumer who does not know the 
proprietor of “www.buyorleasealexus.com” expends effort and 
resources to clear his confusion. This seems comparable to the market 
disruption caused by “Beer Nuts” and “Brew Nuts,” “Dairy Queen” 
and “Dairy Queens,” and “Pegasus Petroleum” and Mobil Oil’s red 
flying horse logo.134 By saying that confusion does not exist because 
consumers have become familiar with this lack of clarity, trademark 
law focuses on facts that cannot exist without confusing consumers 
first. 
B. Trademark Law’s Inevitable Introduction of Confusion 
Ironically, persistent consumer confusion also comes from the 
very process of assigning and enforcing trademark rights. Although 
federal law provides for the national registration of marks,135 our 
trademark system does a relatively poor job of making sure that only 
one producer claims ownership of a given mark. Indeed, our 
trademark law contemplates that, in some cases, multiple producers 
can use the same mark on competing products, and this permitted use 
practically guarantees the eventual confusion of consumers.136 Even in 
cases where ownership of a mark is clear, the very process of 
enforcing trademark rights confuses consumers. This confusion 
happens because findings of trademark infringement generally result 
in injunctions that force losing defendants to rebrand their 
products.137 This rebranding confuses consumers familiar with the 
defendant’s now-prohibited brand by making it impossible for those 
consumers to use the previously familiar, but now outlawed, mark to 
find their preferred goods. 
1.  Confusion Introduced by the Initial Assignment of Trademark 
Rights 
According to trademark convention, consumers ideally should 
never have to consider two competitors who use the same mark on 
 
117, 125 (D. Mass. 1999) (“[C]onsumers will realize they are at the wrong site and go to an 
Internet search engine to find the right one.”). 
 134. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing the small amount of 
confusion associated with these cases). 
 135. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–54 (2012) (providing for registration of marks under federal 
law). 
 136. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 137. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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competing products, for doing so implies confusion over the true 
maker of competing goods. Of course, trademark law cannot 
completely prevent rivals from independently using identical or 
similar marks. Nevertheless, the rules used to assign ownership of 
marks can make it easier for rivals to avoid claiming rights to similar 
marks. 
For example, the law could assign ownership of a mark to the 
first claimant who registers the mark. Such a rule would be clear and 
relatively easy to enforce. More importantly, registration as a 
condition of ownership ensures that those adopting a new mark are 
practically certain to know if someone else already owns the mark. 
Such knowledge would make it highly unlikely that more than one 
party would use and claim ownership of a given mark. 
Interestingly, U.S. law does not assign trademark rights on this 
basis. Instead, our trademark system grants rights to those who first 
make bona fide use of a trademark in commerce.138 This rule means 
that a producer adopting a new mark does not have to make a formal 
claim with the government to gain rights in the mark.139 It can simply 
affix the mark to goods that are sold to the public.140 The producer 
may apply to register the mark with the federal government, but the 
application will fail unless the producer has used the mark.141 Even if 
successful, registration does not guarantee complete rights to the 
mark, for anyone who has used the mark before registration becomes 
effective may continue to make limited use of the mark.142 
 
 138. See Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1893) (“[T]he exclusive 
right to the use of the mark or device claimed as a trade-mark is founded on priority of 
appropriation; that is to say, the claimant of the trade-mark must have been the first to use 
or employ the same on like articles of production.”); Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent 
Techs., Inc., 186 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that priority of use establishes right 
to a trademark); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(“The exclusive right to a trademark belongs to one who first uses it in connection with 
specified goods.”). 
 139. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (extending 
protection to unregistered trademarks); Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, 
Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2006) (granting protection to the plaintiff’s unregistered 
mark); Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding 
that unregistered marks are eligible for protection). 
 140. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768; Louis Vuitton Malletier, 454 F.2d at 115–16; Star 
Indus., 412 F.3d at 381. 
 141. See Aycock Eng’g, Inc. v. Airflite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The 
registration of a mark that does not meet the use requirement is void ab initio.”); 
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 19:10 (“The mark must have been ‘used in commerce’ 
before the registration will issue [on the principal register].”). 
 142. See Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 435 (7th Cir. 
1999) (“[A] trademark application is always subject to previously established common law 
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Assigning trademark rights this way leads to consumer 
confusion. By making ownership dependent on use, our trademark 
system practically guarantees that rivals will sometimes try to claim 
ownership in the same mark. Those rivals will try to perfect their 
claims to the mark by using the marks in commerce. This frequently 
leads to competing marketing campaigns designed to make 
consumers aware of the new mark followed by the formal use of the 
mark on goods sold to the public. Of course, these rival campaigns 
and product launches mean that consumers will encounter and be 
confused by two producers using the same mark on competing goods. 
In theory, this confusion might be short lived if trademark law 
quickly settled competing claims to the same mark and gave one party 
all rights to use the mark. This quick settlement does not happen, 
though, because our trademark system limits the initial award of 
trademark rights to the geographical areas where a trademark 
claimant has actually used the mark. 
The cases of United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.143 and 
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores144 illustrate this point. In 
United Drug, the petitioner’s predecessor in interest began using the 
mark “Rex” in Massachusetts for the sale of medicine.145 That use 
began in 1877 and continued for some time as the plaintiff introduced 
its products in a wider geographic area.146 In 1883, the respondent 
began using “Rex” on medicine in and around Louisville, 
Kentucky.147 At that time, the plaintiff had not begun the sale of Rex 
medicines in Kentucky, and indeed, the defendant did not know 
about the plaintiff’s use of “Rex” in remote areas.148 In 1912, the 
plaintiff began selling Rex medicine in the Louisville area.149 When 
the conflicting uses of the mark became apparent, litigation 
followed.150 The district court ruled that the petitioner’s prior 
 
trademark rights of another party.”); Daniel Group v. Service Performance Grp., Inc., 753 
F. Supp. 2d 541, 546 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (citing and quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 10, with 
approval); MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 16:18.50 (“Neither application for nor 
registration of a mark at the federal level wipes out the prior nonregistered, common law 
rights of others. The nonregistered rights of a senior user continue and are not erased by 
the later federal registration of a junior user.”). 
 143. 248 U.S. 90 (1918). 
 144. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 145. United Drug, 248 U.S. at 94. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 94. 
 148. Id. at 94–95. 
 149. Id. at 95. 
 150. See id. at 93–96. 
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adoption of the mark gave the petitioner exclusive rights to the 
mark.151 The court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court 
agreed.152 
In so ruling, the Court clearly established the principle that 
trademark rights arise from an established business use of the mark.153 
Accordingly, use alone does not establish national rights to a 
trademark.154 Instead, the right extends only so far as the geographic 
reach of the trademark claimant’s actual use.155 This limitation means 
that a trademark claimant has no rights against good faith junior users 
of the same mark who conduct business in areas geographically 
remote from the claimant’s use. Indeed, the Court held that such a 
junior user would actually have rights superior to the senior user in 
the areas where the junior user moved first.156 This holding meant that 
the United Drug petitioner, despite adopting “Rex” as its mark before 
the respondent, actually had no right to use “Rex” in the Louisville, 
Kentucky area.157 
The principle laid down in United Drug practically guarantees 
that consumer confusion will eventually arise. Inevitably, two 
potential rivals will occasionally use the same or similar marks on 
competing goods in separate markets. If they do so in good faith, they 
both establish rights in the mark and will begin expanding their 
businesses. And, when the two businesses finally meet in a shared 
market, consumer confusion is certain because the two rivals will sell 
competing products under the same mark. Of course, this problem 
could be ameliorated if registration of a mark conferred national 
rights on the first person to register the mark. However, geographic 
limits on trademark rights exist even when a trademark owner 
successfully registers. 
 
 151. Id. at 96. 
 152. Id. at 96, 104. 
 153. Id. at 97 (“There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right 
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is 
employed.”). 
 154. Id. at 98 (“[T]he adoption of a trade-mark does not, at least in the absence of 
some valid legislation enacted for the purpose, project the right of protection in advance 
of the extension of the trade, or operate as a claim of territorial rights over areas into 
which it thereafter may be deemed desirable to extend the trade.”). 
 155. Id. (“[T]he expression . . . that a trade-mark right is not limited in its enjoyment by 
territorial bounds, is true only in the sense that wherever the trade goes, attended by the 
use of the mark, the right of the trader to be protected against the sale by others of their 
wares in the place of his wares will be sustained.”). 
 156. Id. at 100–02. 
 157. Id. at 103–04. 
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For example, in Dawn Donut, the plaintiff, Dawn Donut, used 
the marks “Dawn” and “Dawn Donut” to sell doughnut mix and 
retail doughnuts in a number of states, including Michigan and New 
York.158 Dawn first used the marks in 1922 and registered them in 
1927.159 Starting in 1951, the defendant, Hart’s Food, used the 
“Dawn” mark to sell retail doughnuts in the area of Rochester, New 
York.160 Dawn Donut objected and filed suit.161 
Dawn Donut’s claim was quite simple. Federal registration 
meant that the defendant had constructive notice of Dawn Donut’s 
prior use of the mark, and Dawn Donut could therefore prevent 
Hart’s from making use of the mark.162 The Second Circuit disagreed. 
In ruling for Hart’s, the Second Circuit noted that Dawn Donut had 
not used the “Dawn” mark to sell retail doughnuts around Rochester 
for decades.163 Accordingly, Hart’s use of the mark was highly 
unlikely to cause consumers confusion because Rochester area 
customers would not be familiar with Dawn Donuts sold at retail.164 
Accordingly, Dawn Donuts could not stop Hart’s from using the mark 
unless Dawn Donuts actually began using the “Dawn” mark on retail 
doughnuts in the Rochester area.165 
Note again that trademark’s rules for assigning and enforcing 
ownership of marks practically guarantee confusion. Sooner or later, 
a mark owner like Dawn Donuts will move into an area analogous to 
Rochester where a business like Hart’s will have already been using 
the mark. The senior user may enjoy the satisfaction of making the 
junior user of the mark stop, but confusion will already be inevitable 
because consumers who see the senior user’s goods sold under the 
mark will naturally wonder if the goods were actually made by the 
junior user. This confusion cannot be easily reduced or avoided 
without changing existing law about the initial assignment and 
enforcement of trademark rights. 
2.  Confusion Introduced by Trademark Judgments 
The process of assigning and enforcing trademark rights creates 
confusion even when rules of geographic priority have no effect. In 
 
 158. 267 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 159. Id. at 361–62. 
 160. Id. at 361. 
 161. Id. at 362. 
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almost every trademark case worth litigating, the plaintiff makes a 
plausible claim that consumers will be confused, and the defendant 
makes a credible claim to the contrary. Frequently, both litigants are 
right because consumers vary in their responses to trademarks. Some 
consumers will mistakenly believe that the plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
marks indicate the same source, while others will correctly distinguish 
between the marks. These contrasting responses set the stage for 
confusion. 
If a court decides a case like this for the defendant, it obviously 
permits some degree of consumer confusion to continue. While the 
court may believe that, on the whole, most consumers are not 
confused, this does nothing to help the minority of consumers who 
are confused. The court’s decision for the defendant means that those 
consumers will continue to face confusion until they figure things out 
for themselves. 
The persistence of confusion after a decision against 
infringement may help explain why judges seem willing to find 
infringement even when the likelihood of confusion seems small. 
Finding infringement seems to eliminate confusion at little cost. The 
minority of consumers who face confusion will no longer do so. And, 
presumably, the majority of consumers who were not confused will 
still be able to distinguish between the two marks. 
Unfortunately, this thinking overlooks the likelihood that 
eliminating confusion for those unable to distinguish between the two 
marks will introduce new and different confusion for those who were 
not initially confused. Remember, the usual consequence of a 
decision in favor of the plaintiff is an injunction forbidding the 
defendant from using its mark.166 This injunction forces the defendant 
to rebrand its goods, impairing the ability of previously unconfused 
consumers to find their preferred products. As an initial matter, their 
preferred product disappears because it is pulled off the market as an 
infringing product. Then, when it is reintroduced to the market under 
a new name, consumers will be confused because they will not 
initially know that the product sold under the new name is actually 
their preferred brand made by their preferred manufacturer. In short, 
trademark law will, under the guise of reducing confusion, do the very 
 
 166. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 30:1 (“An injunction is the usual and standard 
remedy once trademark infringement has been found.”). 
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thing it is supposed to prevent—namely, make it harder for some 
consumers to identify and purchase their preferred goods.167 
To see a concrete example of how this might happen, consider E. 
& J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero,168 a case involving the 
well-known American wine producer, Gallo, and Consorzio del Gallo 
Nero, an Italian trade association promoting Italian Chianti Classico 
wines.169 Consorzio chose its name “Consorzio del Gallo Nero” 
because its members had used the symbol of a black rooster (“gallo 
nero” in Italian) on their wines.170 When Consorzio decided to mount 
a campaign to promote the sale of Chianti Classico wines in the 
United States, it used the words “Gallo Nero” in advertisements for 
its wine.171 Gallo objected and sent Consorzio a cease and desist 
letter, but Consorzio eventually went ahead with its campaign.172 
Gallo then sued for trademark infringement.173 
It is easy to imagine how this case could have come out in favor 
of either party. On the one hand, some consumers might have 
confused “Gallo” and “Gallo Nero,” perhaps believing that Gallo had 
begun marketing a special line of Gallo Nero wines. On the other 
hand, other consumers probably suffered no confusion at all. These 
consumers included those who already knew the precise identity of 
Consorzio del Gallo Nero as the trade association for Chianti Classico 
wines. Some of these consumers surely liked Consorzio del Gallo 
Nero wines (perhaps because they had experienced the wines in 
Italy), deliberately searched for them, and bought them. 
The Gallo court found that a likelihood of confusion existed and 
enjoined Consorzio del Gallo Nero from using “Gallo” when 
marketing its wines in the United States.174 When Consorzio del Gallo 
Nero chose a new name under which to market its wines, consumers 
not confused by its use of “Gallo” probably experienced confusion 
 
 167. The size and significance of this disruption is confirmed by the considerable 
literature that describes the problems associated with rebranding. This literature reflects 
the realization that consumers will not easily overcome the confusion associated with 
rebranding. See Aaron Perzanowski, Unbranding, Confusion, and Deception, 24 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 17–31 (2010) (arguing that the structural features of trademark law are 
poorly positioned to serve as an effective restraint on the consumer confusion that 
rebranding can create). 
 168. 782 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 169. Id. at 460. 
 170. Id. 
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 174. Id. at 471. 
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when they encountered the new name. Even if that name bore 
reasonable resemblance to “Consorzio del Gallo Nero,” it is likely 
that consumers had to consider the possibility that a rival seller of 
Chianti Classico wines had entered the market. The time consumers 
spent learning the correct meaning of the new name therefore 
represents confusion caused by trademark law.175 
3.  Confusion Introduced by the Abandonment of Trademark Rights 
A trademark holder does not necessarily own rights in a mark 
forever. Among other things, a trademark holder risks forfeiting 
ownership of its marks if it stops using them. Under federal law, a 
trademark holder abandons its mark by discontinuing use with no 
intent to resume.176 Three consecutive years of nonuse provides prima 
facie evidence of the intent to abandon.177 
At first blush, one might conclude that abandonment through 
nonuse carries little risk of consumer confusion. A mark that 
disappears from use for three years surely loses a great deal of its 
value as a source identifier. If a new producer then comes forward to 
use an abandoned mark and establish new rights, one might think that 
consumers will adopt the new meaning for the mark fairly easily. 
Closer reflection suggests that consumer confusion is not so 
easily avoided. In many cases, trademarks retain considerable source 
identification power long after they are no longer in use. For example, 
the mark “Pan-Am” evokes strong memories of the defunct airline.178 
If this mark is considered abandoned, new users of “Pan-Am” will 
surely confuse consumers, who will wonder if the old airline has 
somehow come back into business. This suggests that marks retaining 
power as source identifiers should not be considered abandoned, even 
 
 175. See Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 60, 78–87 (2008) (arguing that trademark law inadequately recognizes and protects 
the interests of non-confused consumers, leading to the expansion of trademark rights). 
 176. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
 177. Id. 
 178. The Pan-Am mark has been re-used a number of times by unaffiliated airlines 
capitalizing on consumer familiarity with and affection for the original airline. See Bill 
Chappell, Pan-Am Airline Set To Return to the Air Next Month, NPR (Oct. 20, 2010, 8:18 
PM), http://npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/10/29/130926486/pan-am-airline-will-return-to-
the-air-next-month (mentioning five attempted revivals of the Pan-Am brand); Bruce 
Drum, Pan American Airways To Revive the Pan Am Brand with Boeing 737-800s, 
WORLD AIRLINE NEWS (Apr. 17, 2014), http://worldairlinenews.com/2014/04/17/pan-
american-airways-to-revive-the-pan-am-brand-with-boeing-737-800s/ (showing a recent 
attempt to revive the Pan-Am brand). 
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if use has been stopped with no intent to resume. For better or worse, 
courts have not interpreted the law in this way. 
In Silverman v. CBS Inc.,179 the Second Circuit found that the 
plaintiff, CBS, could not stop the defendant, Silverman, from 
developing a musical based on the Amos ‘N’ Andy radio and 
television shows created by CBS.180 Among other things, the court 
ruled that CBS had abandoned the Amos ‘N’ Andy Show trademark 
because the network had not commercially exploited the mark in 
twenty years.181 CBS’s case had considerable equitable appeal. The 
network stopped broadcasting the show primarily because the show 
caused racial controversy.182 Accordingly, CBS could plausibly argue 
that it had no intent to abandon the work and that it hoped to revive 
the show someday.183 This argument fell on deaf ears. The court held 
that because CBS had no reasonably foreseeable plans to use its 
mark, the necessary intent to abandon existed.184 CBS therefore no 
longer had rights to the mark.185 
Whatever one thinks about whether CBS had the statutorily 
defined intent to cause abandonment, it is quite likely that the public 
had not forgotten about the Amos ‘N’ Andy show and its affiliation 
with CBS. The show originated on radio as one of the country’s most 
popular programs,186 and the television series was shown from 1951 to 
1966.187 Accordingly, when Silverman brought his show to the public, 
consumers surely would wonder if CBS had revived the Amos ‘N’ 
Andy show or was otherwise involved in the musical. Such confusion 
is precisely the kind of confusion that trademark law considers 
actionable in other cases, but this confusion obviously did not stop the 
court from ruling against CBS. Accordingly, it is quite clear that, in at 
least some cases, judicial findings of abandonment introduce 
consumer confusion.188 
 
 179. 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 180. Id. at 43 (holding that the plaintiff’s trademarks were invalid). 
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 182. Id. at 45. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 47. 
 185. Id. at 47–48. 
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 188. Other abandonment cases that create confusion include Rust Environment & 
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C. Deliberately Accepting Consumer Confusion 
A final source of persistent consumer confusion comes from 
accepting such confusion in order to prevent undue harm to free 
competition. Such a phenomenon should come as no surprise. After 
all, the purpose of trademark law is the prevention of confusion that 
damages the operation of markets.189 It therefore makes sense for 
trademark law to avoid imposing liability if doing so would 
undermine the very competition that makes markets work in the first 
place. Nevertheless, trademark plaintiffs have argued that preventing 
consumer confusion is more important than other competition-related 
concerns, and courts have often rejected these arguments by refusing 
to follow the eradicate confusion norm as vigorously as they could.190 
The doctrines of fair use and functionality offer good examples of 
how trademark law violates the eradicate confusion norm by 
accepting consumer confusion.191 
1.  Fair Use 
A previously known word may acquire sufficient distinctiveness 
to become a trademark, but this does not mean that old meanings 
associated with the word completely disappear. It is therefore 
possible that a potential defendant will use a mark merely to describe 
the defendant’s goods in a non-source-identifying way and that the 
trademark holder will nevertheless consider such a use confusing. For 
example, a candy manufacturer could gain a trademark in the word 
“Sweetart” for candies, and a juice manufacturer might use the word 
“sweet-tart” to describe its juice.192 Such behavior arguably creates a 
likelihood of confusion over whether the same manufacturer makes 
the candies and juice. However, trademark law generally excuses 
 
from “First National Bank of Denver” to “IntraWest Bank of Denver,” could not prevent 
the defendant from using the name “First National Bank of Denver”). Courts occasionally 
prevent a subsequent user of an abandoned mark from using the mark in order to prevent 
public confusion. See Indianapolis Colts v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 
410, 416 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a National Football League team, the “Indianapolis 
Colts,” had the right to prevent a Canadian Football League team from using the 
abandoned name “Baltimore Colts” because the public would be confused). However, 
subsequent decisions limit the reach of such holdings, leaving abandoned marks generally 
free for adoption. See Rust Env’t & Infrastructure, 131 F.3d at 1215 (finding in favor of the 
defendant and characterizing the facts of Indianapolis Colts as “unique”). 
 189. See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. 
 190. See infra notes 194–214 and accompanying text. 
 191. See infra notes 194–214 and accompanying text. 
 192. See Sunmark, Inc., v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1060–61 (7th 
Cir. 1995). 
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defendants in cases like this under the affirmative defense of fair use 
if the mark has been used in good faith and solely in a manner 
“descriptive of the actor’s goods.”193 
The fair use defense raises an important question about the 
priorities of trademark law. If the defense did not exist, defendants 
could not make good faith, descriptive uses of marks, and this 
restriction would impair the ability of defendants to inform 
consumers about the basic qualities of their products. At the same 
time, however, the fair use defense could prevent trademark holders 
from eliminating consumer confusion. This issue raises the question 
of whether a defendant first should have to establish that its behavior 
creates no likelihood of consumer confusion before claiming fair use. 
If trademark law values the elimination of confusion more than the 
accurate description of products, the answer to this question would 
presumably be “yes.” Conversely, if accurate description is more 
important than eliminating confusion, the answer would be “no.” 
The Supreme Court considered this very question in KP 
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.194 KP 
Permanent Make-Up involved a dispute between two make-up 
manufacturers who both used a version of the term “micro color” in 
marketing their products.195 The defendant, Lasting, registered the 
term as a mark in 1992, and the plaintiff, KP, produced a brochure 
using “micro color” in prominent type in 1999.196 KP justified its use 
of “micro color” under the fair use defense.197 Lasting countered KP’s 
fair use claim by arguing that fair use could not exist unless the 
defendant had proved the absence of a likelihood of confusion.198 
Such an argument would, if accepted, shield consumers from the 
confusion of seeing the term “micro color” used in different ways. 
The Supreme Court rejected Lasting’s contention, holding 
instead that some undefined level of confusion was entirely 
compatible with a finding of fair use.199 The Court recognized that 
consumer confusion could affect whether a given use was fair, but the 
mere existence of confusion could not automatically negate the 
defense because of the interests served by the accurate descriptions of 
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goods.200 The Court supported this reasoning by noting that “the 
common law of unfair competition also tolerated some degree of 
confusion from a descriptive use of words contained in another 
person’s trademark.”201 This led to the conclusion “that some 
possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair 
use.”202 
2.  Functionality 
Like fair use, the doctrine of functionality also permits some 
degree of consumer confusion in order to preserve free competition. 
Functionality assumes importance when a plaintiff makes a 
trademark claim over a product feature that not only has acquired 
distinctiveness but also serves an important physical purpose in the 
value of the product itself.203 If trademark law protected such product 
features, it would prevent consumer confusion by preserving an 
exclusive association between the product feature and the trademark 
claimant. However, this would also prevent competitors from making 
competing products with the same desired features, thus hindering 
free-market competition. 
For example, in Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, 
Inc.,204 the plaintiff, Marketing Displays, made temporary road signs 
with an unusual dual-spring design that kept the signs from blowing 
down in strong gusts of wind.205 Because Marketing Displays held 
patents over this technology, it was the only producer of these signs 
and consumers arguably came to rely on these springs as source 
identifiers associated with Marketing Displays.206 When Marketing 
Displays’ patents expired, the defendant, Traffix, began making and 
selling signs using the same dual-spring technology.207 Marketing 
Displays then sued for trade-dress infringement.208 
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The Supreme Court found in favor of Traffix.209 In so ruling, the 
Court expressed concern that allowing protection for functional 
features, like the dual-spring, would harm free competition.210 
Preventing competitors like Traffix from using the dual-spring feature 
would be tantamount to giving patent protection to Marketing 
Displays despite the springs being part of the public domain.211 The 
Court refused to accept this result, stating that concerns about 
competition were, at least in this case, more important than 
preventing consumer confusion.212 Trademark protection would 
therefore be denied even if the dual-spring technology had acquired 
distinctiveness.213 This meant accepting the confusion of any 
consumers who used the dual-spring feature as a source identifier.214 
The pervasive and persistent confusion described in this Part 
challenges conventional wisdom about consumer confusion. As noted 
earlier, trademark convention advocates eliminating modest 
confusion precisely because such confusion supposedly impairs the 
proper operation of markets.215 This impairment implies that 
widespread failure to eliminate such confusion would leave our 
markets seriously damaged. Indeed, the aggressive expansion of 
trademark rights and the eradicate confusion norm can be seen as the 
implementation of this very line of thinking. 
What then are we to make of the many instances of confusion 
that trademark law accepts or even encourages? If trademark law’s 
conventional wisdom about confusion is correct, then our trademark 
system ought to have some pretty significant problems because—as 
Part II has described—consumers face minor confusion all the time 
and trademark law accepts it. If modest confusion really does damage 
markets, then we should see consumer preferences regularly 
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frustrated by the confusion that trademark law fails to eliminate. Of 
course, this does not happen. On the whole, consumers find the goods 
they want, which suggests that trademark convention is wrong about 
the harms associated with modest consumer confusion. Indeed, as 
Part III shall argue, it is far more likely that modest consumer 
confusion actually plays a constructive role for our trademark system 
and, by extension, our markets. 
III.  THE BENEFITS OF PERSISTENT CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK 
The constructive value of confusion emerges from realizing that 
trademark law can reduce consumer confusion only if consumers have 
some basic ability to identify and distinguish between trademarks. At 
first blush, one might think that consumers are born with a full 
understanding of trademarks and naturally know how to navigate a 
modern commercial marketplace. In fact, however, even the most 
basic consumer abilities develop over time from exposure to 
trademarks encountered in daily life.216 
This process begins during childhood.217 As consumer researchers 
explain, a child progresses through many stages of consumer 
socialization that reflect a growing awareness of and ability to deal 
with the complex messages found in commercial marketplaces.218 
Although the relevant research does not focus specifically on 
trademarks, it does say a great deal about the development of 
consumer knowledge, decision making, and brand awareness.219 It 
therefore seems appropriate to apply knowledge about general 
 
 216. See J. Wesley Hutchinson & Eric M. Eisenstein, Consumer Learning and 
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consumer development and learning to our understanding of 
trademark law. 
Professor Deborah Roedder John presents the development of 
the child consumer in three stages: the perceptual stage (ages three to 
seven), the analytical stage (ages seven to eleven), and the reflective 
stage (age eleven to adult).220 In the perceptual stage, children begin 
their development as consumers with a relatively simple egocentric 
outlook that does not recognize how others perceive products or the 
consumer process.221 Consumers in the perceptual stage focus on what 
they can readily perceive and develop familiarity with brands, but 
they rarely exhibit complex decision making skills or strategies.222 
These consumers often make choices on the basis of limited 
information that is easy to perceive and comprehend, such as size.223 
Nevertheless, these children begin to develop brand preferences and 
an understanding of the consumer search process.224 
Things change rapidly as young consumers progress through the 
analytical stage, in which children learn to consider multiple 
perspectives about products and choices.225 These young consumers 
can name multiple brands, develop abstract and detailed knowledge 
of products, and learn more sophisticated search strategies that focus 
attention on relevant information.226 These children even begin to 
understand the subtle meanings society attaches to possessions, a skill 
crucial to the effective comprehension of modern trademarks.227 
By the time a young consumer reaches the reflective stage, he 
has begun to acquire adult consumer habits and skills.228 Brand 
knowledge becomes more detailed and sophisticated as the awareness 
and recall of brand names rises.229 The consumer pays even more 
attention to the social aspects of consumption and understands the 
status and prestige associated with certain brands.230 Search 
sophistication increases as well.231 Consumers in the reflective stage 
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adapt search strategies to different situations.232 They respond to 
complex situations by focusing more effectively on the relevant 
information, and they seek out additional information from trusted 
sources.233 
Of course, consumer development does not end with 
adulthood.234 Rather, the skills developed in childhood allow adult 
consumers to continue adapting to the trademarks they encounter.235 
Research on adult-consumer learning confirms the common intuition 
that continued exposure to products increases consumer familiarity 
with those products.236 That familiarity leads to expertise, as 
consumers learn from their accumulated product experiences.237 
Finally, and most importantly, increased expertise makes people 
better at finding the products they want quickly and accurately.238 In 
short, consumers learn to navigate the markets they encounter, and 
they get better and better at doing so over time. 
The process by which this improvement occurs involves the 
combination of unconscious and conscious thought. As Professor 
Daniel Kahneman explains, the human mind operates simultaneously 
in two different modes.239 The first, which he labels System 1, 
“operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no 
sense of voluntary control.”240 The second, which he calls System 2, 
“allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, 
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including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are 
often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and 
concentration.”241 Both of these systems operate when a person is 
awake.242 System 1 handles most functions.243 It governs the tasks that 
are familiar, routine, and automatic.244 These include understanding 
simple sentences, walking, and recognizing facial expressions.245 By 
contrast, System 2 handles complex, novel, and challenging tasks that 
require significant thought and concentration.246 These tasks include 
logical argument, math problems, and searching memory when 
confronted with a surprising situation.247 
System 1 and System 2 matter to the study of trademark law 
because consumers use both to understand marks. A consumer 
walking through a grocery store has a number of ingrained shopping 
preferences that System 1 executes. If she eats Kellogg’s Frosted 
Flakes every day, System 1 probably scans the shelf quickly for 
something like Tony the Tiger, and she puts the cereal in her 
shopping cart without further reflection. 
Importantly, however, System 1 is doing more than searching for 
Tony the Tiger in supermarkets. System 1 is also busy collecting 
impressions of everything the consumer encounters. Using System 1 is 
not a process of conscious memorization. Rather, System 1 
unconsciously notices things, associates them with other things, and 
files the associations away for future use.248 These associations include 
spontaneous evaluations of product qualities (“Frosted Flakes taste 
sweet”), impressions collected from casual encounters with 
advertisements (“Apple computers are cool”), and information 
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gleaned from daily life (“Harvard is a prestigious university”).249 It is 
entirely possible, and even likely, that this hypothetical consumer 
learned in this very manner to buy Frosted Flakes by searching for 
Tony the Tiger. She liked the cereal, noticed the packaging, and 
formed an association confirmed over time by the experience of many 
satisfactory purchases.250 Because the human mind tends to be lazy,251 
it will allow System 1 to continue accumulating and acting on 
unexamined information in this very manner as long as the results are 
satisfactory. As long as the consumer gets her Frosted Flakes and 
other desired products, she will shop with whatever strategies System 
1 has produced, including System 1’s approach to trademarks.252 
Things work differently, however, when consumers encounter 
surprises and challenges. Because System 1 deals with the familiar 
and routine, surprises and challenges give System 1 trouble.253 When 
this happens, System 2 gets involved and formulates a strategy for 
dealing with the problem at hand.254 For example, our hypothetical 
consumer might be jolted from her System 1 shopping habits by 
encountering new packaging for Kellogg’s Frosted Flakes. If she came 
across a box without Tony the Tiger on it, she might be unsure about 
what was inside. System 2 would then examine the new package 
carefully, looking for clues about the meaning of the new packaging. 
If System 2 concluded that the box did contain Kellogg’s Frosted 
Flakes, she would buy the product, and, if System 2’s prediction 
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proved correct, she would begin associating the new packaging with 
Kellogg’s Frosted Flakes. Remembering this new association and 
acting upon it might take effort at first. However, as she repeated her 
new System 2 strategy, it would become progressively easier to 
execute. Eventually, System 1 would learn from System 2 and adopt 
the previously costly and difficult System 2 association. The new 
packaging would become as familiar and easy to use as the old 
packaging graced by Tony the Tiger.255 
Over time, unconscious and conscious adaptations of the sort 
described above result in consumers whose behaviors and skills 
reflect the trademark environments in which they live. This 
adaptation makes perfect sense. Consumers must learn to navigate 
marketplaces to live successfully in modern society. Indeed, 
consumers have the incentive to improve their skills because nuanced 
and sophisticated understandings of marketplace signals like 
trademarks help consumers identify the goods they want more 
quickly and more accurately. Consumer researchers describe several 
ways in which this happens. 
First, market experience speeds up consumer decision making 
because a person can recall a memorized fact more quickly than he 
can derive it. A person responds almost instantly to “What is 2 + 2?” 
because he used System 2 to learn and commit the answer to his 
memory long ago, and System 1 can now quickly retrieve it. By 
contrast, giving the answer to “What is 17 x 24?” takes much longer 
because he has not memorized the answer and System 2 must figure it 
out.256 When it comes to the functioning of our trademark system, 
things work well in part because consumers remember various marks 
through repeated exposure. This allows consumers to quickly identify 
and distinguish marks from one another, even when considerable 
similarities exist.257 
Second, market experience helps consumers remember and 
make sense of new situations they encounter. A chess master 
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remembers chess positions better than a chess novice because the 
many positions seen and studied by the master give her a larger set of 
experiences from which to draw.258 Prior exposure to and analysis of 
multiple games give the master ways to connect new situations (i.e., 
new chess positions) to knowledge she already has. She understands 
deeper structures that make it easier for her to remember and analyze 
new situations. By contrast, the chess novice has no such experience 
to draw from, so his ability to remember and analyze new chess 
positions effectively is comparatively weak. Similarly, for trademarks, 
repeated exposure to trademarks gives consumers a frame of 
reference in which to place new marks. Someone already familiar 
with how producers use marks will understand quickly how to make 
sense of new marks and their relationship to existing ones. By 
contrast, someone who knows little about marks and their use will be 
easily confused.259 
Third, experience helps consumers generate new knowledge 
about products, both consciously and unconsciously. Psychological 
studies have shown that people subconsciously acquire knowledge 
about the systematically organized patterns they are exposed to, even 
if they are completely unaware that any organized pattern exists.260 In 
particular, their ability to act on the basis of that pattern actually 
increases with exposure to the pattern, even though they have no 
conscious awareness of learning or improvement.261 This suggests that 
people will get better at responding to subtle cues about trademarks 
with repeated exposure to marks—precisely the kind of exposure that 
begins with early childhood and continues into adulthood. They will, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, learn to predict how producers 
signal their use of a trademark, how trademarks can be distinguished, 
and how to determine just what those trademarks mean. 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, consumers will change 
their search strategies to make them more effective. To be sure, 
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consumers at any given time use ingrained, habitual search strategies 
that System 1 executes, and System 1 continues to use and reinforce 
them as long as the strategy works.262 However, when System 1 makes 
an error or encounters an unfamiliar situation, System 2 steps in to 
figure out a search strategy that avoids the problem.263 If System 2 
comes up with a successful strategy, our consumer will plan to use this 
strategy the next time he is in a similar situation. This may require 
effort, for ingrained, familiar behavior can be difficult to change. 
However, if this new strategy proves successful, the consumer will use 
it more and more frequently until System 1 adopts it as routine.264 The 
end result is a change in consumer behavior brought about by 
adaptation to the trademark “puzzle.” 
The interplay between System 1 and System 2 reveals how 
modest confusion plays a vital role in helping consumers develop 
important cognitive skills. In order for our trademark system to work, 
consumers must gain two crucial skills. First, they need the ability to 
identify and distinguish between trademarks. Second, they must be 
able to receive and understand the subtle messages conveyed by 
trademarks. Both of these skills develop because consumers 
experience confusion. Inexperienced consumers make mistakes 
because they fail to perceive distinctions between marks or do not 
understand the informational significance of perceived features of 
marks. Consumers experience these problems as confusion that arises 
when using System 1, but that confusion spurs System 2 to create 
solutions that ultimately improve the performance of System 1 and—
by extension—our trademark system. 
Consider an analogy to the reading of written texts. Like 
trademarks, written texts often have obvious meanings as well as less 
obvious, subtle ones. Indeed, the majority of our society’s most 
important and communicative texts fit this general description. 
Because writers use texts to convey information explicitly and 
implicitly, our system of written texts cannot function at its highest 
level unless readers have the ability to identify and distinguish similar 
words (such as “there” and “their” or “affect” and “effect”) and 
understand the varied and subtle meanings conveyed when those 
words are strung together. Of course, people are not born with the 
ability to read effectively. Instead, people develop as readers by being 
exposed to textual challenges that confuse them and by learning from 
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the experience. For example, early readers learn first to sound out 
words, letter by letter, before progressing to whole-word reading and 
then more advanced, fluent comprehension.265 Over time, this process 
creates the sophisticated reader with the vocabulary and 
comprehension skills that our system of written texts requires.266 
The same can be said for trademarks. Unless consumers 
encounter challenging (i.e., confusing) trademark situations, they will 
not develop into sophisticated “readers” of trademarks. It may be 
tempting to use trademark law for the purpose of simplifying 
trademarks to the point that consumers can rely solely on System 1 to 
comprehend all of the information that trademarks convey.267 It is, of 
course, highly questionable whether such an effort would succeed. 
However, if it did, the result would be consumers who lack the ability 
to identify and distinguish trademarks or comprehend the messages 
that trademarks convey. By contrast, exposing consumers to 
occasional trademark confusion will activate the use of System 2 to 
resolve confusion and, over time, teach System 1 to deal with such 
complexity automatically and routinely. In short, society benefits 
from allowing confusion to develop sophisticated “readers” of 
trademarks, just as society benefits from allowing confusion to 
develop sophisticated readers of written texts. 
The foregoing generally explains how confusion plays an 
important and constructive role in our trademark system. At the very 
least, modest confusion concerning trademarks actually helps 
consumers avoid confusion by helping them develop valuable 
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cognitive skills that make distinguishing and understanding 
trademarks possible. This process of education occurs over the 
consumers’ entire lives and, although individual instances of 
confusion may be challenging and costly to overcome, the intellectual 
habits developed become ingrained to the point that System 1 uses 
them effectively as “second nature,” allowing consumers to avoid 
confusion more easily in the long run.268 More importantly, in some 
cases, increased consumer abilities actually improve our trademark 
system by making it possible for the system to transmit more 
information to consumers more efficiently.269 We can see these 
beneficial effects arise in a number of areas where modest confusion 
persists. 
A. Protection of Marks Lacking Inherent Distinctiveness 
Let us return again to the protection of marks that lack inherent 
distinctiveness. If producers used trademarks only to convey identity, 
there would be relatively little reason to protect marks that lack 
inherent distinctiveness because inherently distinctive marks can 
identify producers more effectively and with fewer social costs. 
As noted earlier, consumers instantly recognize inherently 
distinctive marks as source identifiers.270 Protecting these marks 
makes sense because they are very good at helping consumers make 
the desired associations between producers and their products. 
Consumers immediately know that they are dealing with a source 
identifier, so they do not consider the possibility that the mark is 
simply a descriptive term or a product feature. The connection 
between producer and product therefore emerges quickly and with a 
low possibility of error. 
By contrast, the case for protecting marks that lack inherent 
distinctiveness is much weaker. Consumers do not normally regard 
descriptive words, colors, odors, or other product features as source 
identifiers.271 Accordingly, these marks do not always create the 
desired association between producer and product because consumers 
must consider the possibility that they are dealing with something 
other than a trademark. For example, as noted earlier, consumers 
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may not immediately understand that a “Safari hat” is a product sold 
by a particular manufacturer, instead of a hat designed for hunting 
trips in Africa. This raises a real possibility of error. 
Moreover, even if consumers figure out that they are dealing 
with source identifiers, marks lacking inherent distinctiveness also 
frequently embody characteristics that consumers value for reasons 
other than source identification. A scent, color, or decorative fabric 
pattern may be aesthetically pleasing. Distinctive product 
configuration also may have functional significance that affects the 
quality of the good. This makes trademark protection socially costly. 
If the proposed mark is a word, then there is the risk that the 
trademark holder will prevent or hinder competitors from using the 
same word to convey non-source-related information about similar 
goods.272 If the proposed mark is a product feature, we must worry 
that trademark holders will prevent competition—not in information 
about goods, but in the goods themselves.273 For example, if a bicycle 
maker somehow gets protection for the color of its bikes, no one else 
can sell bikes in the same color. If consumers are indifferent to bike 
color, this may pose no problem. But if consumers prefer bikes in the 
trademark holder’s color (perhaps because consumers find the color 
attractive or valuable for being seen in traffic), then the trademark 
holder will face reduced competition for its goods and can raise its 
prices. 
The foregoing shows that there are good reasons to protect only 
inherently distinctive marks, for those marks convey the simple 
identity of a producer more effectively and at lower social cost than 
marks lacking inherent distinctiveness. Nevertheless, trademark law 
protects both kinds of marks and for good reason. Subtle messages 
that producers want to convey often lend themselves to marks that 
lack inherent distinctiveness. For instance, the red sole on the bottom 
of a shoe associates the product and the producer with glamour and 
sexiness.274 The label “Safari shoe” captures not only the general style 
of the product, but also the mystery and adventure of African safaris. 
If trademarks are to convey messages like this, then trademark law 
 
 272. See supra notes 42–50 and accompanying text. 
 273. Lunney, supra note 19, at 367–68, 485–87. 
 274. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 
206, 227 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that red outsoles on black high-heeled shoes “flaunt a 
glamorous statement” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2014) 
128 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
will have to protect marks lacking inherent distinctiveness. This 
protection of course requires exposing consumers to confusion.275 
At first blush, one might think that this confusion impairs the 
trademark system by causing error and delay in the identification of 
producers. In truth, however, the confusion actually increases the 
value of the system by helping consumers develop cognitive skills that 
support the transmission of subtle messages through trademarks. 
Granted, consumers may experience occasional confusion when 
confronted with new trademarks that lack inherent distinctiveness, 
but working through that confusion is precisely how consumers learn 
that descriptive terms and product features are sometimes used as 
source identifiers.276 More importantly, confusion teaches consumers 
to use context and other social cues to identify and comprehend 
various messages encoded in trademarks. Once consumers learn these 
skills, they become more fluent at them through repetition. 
Eventually, responding to trademarks in a sophisticated manner 
becomes second nature and routine, allowing our trademark system 
to carry more information than it would in the absence of exposure to 
confusion. 
B. Private-Label Goods 
The case of private-label goods offers a slightly different 
illustration of how confusion improves the functioning of our 
trademark system. Again, if trademarks exist only to distinguish one 
producer from the other, it would make sense to force private-label 
sellers not to use packaging that resembles name-brand packaging. 
This would make the packaging of the two producers very easy to tell 
apart and greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of mistaken 
purchases. Of course, trademark law generally allows the use of 
private-label packaging that resembles name-brand packaging, 
exposing consumers to confusion.277 However, there is a payoff for 
this confusion, for it helps consumers develop the cognitive skills to 
receive more information efficiently through the trademark system. 
As courts have recognized, the point of private-label packaging is 
to inform consumers that the private-label good is effectively identical 
to the name-brand good.278 The use of packaging that resembles 
name-brand packaging clearly reminds consumers of the name brand, 
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but differences in packaging, such as a different product name and 
label, inform the consumer that the producer of the good is not the 
same. If trademark law forced private-label producers to use 
packaging that did not resemble name-brand packaging, initial 
consumer confusion would clearly be reduced. However, consumers 
would also lose an efficient way of being informed about private-label 
goods and their basic qualities. Consumers could, in theory, be asked 
to read labels directly comparing private-label goods to name-brand 
goods. However, reading these labels would be more cumbersome 
and slower than looking for private-label packaging. 
This is why it makes sense for trademark law to expose 
consumers to confusion over private-label goods. Without question, 
allowing the use of private-label packaging risks consumer error, 
particularly when consumers hastily buy goods while on “autopilot.” 
Over time, however, consumers have discovered their errors, and 
they have consciously learned how to avoid mistakes when 
confronting private-label goods. Indeed, as Kahneman and others 
predicted, consumers have adopted new cognitive strategies that are 
now routine because of repetition and practice.279 This has greatly 
reduced the likelihood of consumer error, and, more importantly, it 
has given consumers the ability to receive information about the 
source and qualities of private-label merchandise more efficiently 
than they could if private-label packaging could not resemble name-
brand packaging. In other words, it is again important to expose 
consumers to confusion in order to develop the consumer skills that 
allow our trademark system—and, by extension, markets—to 
function efficiently. 
 
C. Fair Use 
Fair use offers one more example of how confusion improves our 
trademark system. The conflict addressed by this doctrine arises 
because people sometimes give trademarks more than one meaning. 
For example, in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 
Inc.,280 the plaintiff and defendant used “micro color” in two different 
ways.281 The plaintiff used the term as a trademark identifying its 
cosmetics, while the defendant used the term to describe its 
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cosmetics.282 Trademark holders understandably object to the 
creation of unauthorized meanings for their trademarks. If successful, 
their claims of infringement would not only deprive consumers of the 
information conveyed by the defendants, but also would eliminate the 
possibility of consumer confusion over the proper meaning to 
attribute to terms like “micro color.” 
Trademark convention would generally regard the confusion 
created by fair use as a social cost that permanently offsets the social 
benefits of trademark law. Society benefits from allowing others to 
use trademarks to fairly describe goods, but those gains must be 
weighed against a permanent barrage of confusion that consumers 
face when they encounter terms like “micro color” in varying 
contexts. Closer reflection reveals, however, that trademark 
convention is wrong and that confusion itself creates social benefits. 
Once again, the key to seeing this conclusion comes from 
consumer adaptation to confusion. Consumers may indeed be unsure 
about the meaning of terms like “micro color,” but this lack of 
certainty will not lead to permanent confusion. Consumers who sense 
uncertainty will devote conscious thought to figuring out exactly what 
“micro color” means, and this effort will improve consumer resistance 
to confusion in two ways. First, consumers will understand the 
different ways in which “micro color” gets used, reducing the 
likelihood of confusion over the use of this and similar terms in the 
future. Second, consumers will become aware of and more attuned to 
the contextual cues that signal when a term is being used as a source 
identifier or a descriptor. This process is similar to the one that 
enables consumers to recognize things that lack inherent 
distinctiveness as trademarks, and it makes consumers resistant to 
future confusion when they encounter trademarks used as plain 
descriptors. In short, consumer adaptation to confusion increases the 
value of our trademark system because it actually lowers consumer 
susceptibility to confusion in the long run. This adaptation allows our 
trademark law to permit descriptive uses of marks as fair use, and this 
usage increases the amount of information consumers receive. 
IV.  PERSISTENT CONFUSION, TRADEMARK CONVENTION, AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 
The persistence of confusion in our trademark system and its 
beneficial effects challenge modern trademark’s embrace of the 
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eradicate confusion norm. If, as modern trademark convention holds, 
the eradicate confusion norm truly governs trademark, then the law 
would diligently eliminate almost all confusion as pernicious to the 
proper operation of markets. However, the persistent and ubiquitous 
existence of confusion shows that trademark law conforms to modern 
trademark theory sporadically at best. Instead of consistently 
shielding consumers from confusion, trademark law frequently 
accepts and even encourages behavior that exposes consumers to 
confusion of the very sort that supposedly harms markets. This 
exposes a meaningful gap between significant portions of trademark 
law and modern trademark theory. 
If modern trademark convention is correct in its assertion that 
even modest amounts of confusion damage markets enough to 
warrant a legal remedy,283 the gap between trademark law and 
trademark theory should signal fairly considerable and observable 
market harm. After all, consumers regularly confront multiple 
meanings for marks, and trademark theory predicts that this 
confusion should delay the satisfaction of consumer preferences. 
However, this delay does not generally happen. Markets may not be 
perfect, but consumers usually find what they want and learn to use 
trademarks quite effectively, despite frequently encountering 
confusion. This outcome implies that modern trademark theory’s 
claim about the danger of confusion is overstated, and that the value 
of the eradicate confusion norm is much lower than trademark 
convention would have us believe. Indeed, the relatively smooth 
operation of modern marketplaces suggests that, as noted earlier, 
modest amounts of confusion are not only relatively harmless but also 
beneficial because they help consumers learn to avoid confusion in 
the first place.284 Trademark theory should therefore abandon the 
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eradicate confusion norm and replace it with a more nuanced 
understanding of trademark law that improves the operation of the 
trademark system by appropriately exposing consumers to modest, 
manageable amounts of confusion. 
Implementing this change requires the conscious balancing of 
market disruption caused by confusion against market improvements 
that arise because exposure to confusion makes consumers better at 
avoiding confusion and at understanding subtle messages conveyed 
through the trademark system. In some cases, this balance will clearly 
favor the use of trademark law to prevent confusion. Consider a 
typical dispute in which the defendant and plaintiff use identical or 
nearly identical marks on similar, directly competing goods.285 In this 
situation, the harm to markets is clear and substantial. Consumers 
surely will not know whether the defendant or plaintiff makes the 
goods in question, and it is therefore likely that many mistaken 
purchases will be made. More importantly, the hypothesized facts 
indicate that the benefits associated with exposing consumers to 
confusion are unlikely to materialize. Because the two marks are 
identical and used on directly competing merchandise, consumers will 
find it difficult to come up with an effective strategy for accurately 
identifying the manufacturer. Without such a strategy, System 2 
cannot help System 1 learn to quickly and reliably identify producers, 
making the benefits of increased consumer skill elusive. In short, the 
harm of exposing consumers to confusion surely outweighs the 
benefits of doing so. 
In other cases, particularly when consumers are likely to resolve 
confusion on their own, the balance comes out very differently. For 
example, when the defendant and plaintiff use similar but 
distinguishable marks,286 the harm to markets becomes far more 
speculative because consumers will probably distinguish between the 
 
 285. See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 950, 954 
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding that infringement occurred where the plaintiff and the defendant 
used “THIRST-AID” for beverages); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 
366 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding infringement where the plaintiff and the defendant used 
“Eveready” and “Ever-Ready” on flashlights, lamps, and bulbs); Aveda Corp. v. Evita 
Mktg., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Minn. 1989) (finding infringement where the plaintiff 
and the defendant used “Aveda” and “Avita” on hair products). 
 286. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 256–57 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (finding infringement where the plaintiff used an image of a flying horse and the 
defendant used the word “Pegasus” within the petroleum industry); E. & J. Gallo Winery 
v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 459–60 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding 
infringement where the plaintiff and the defendant used “Gallo” and “Gallo Nero,” 
respectively, in marketing for wine). 
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two producers successfully. Consumers may experience momentary 
confusion and incur search costs to overcome it, but that confusion 
does not disrupt markets as badly as mistaken purchases from the 
wrong manufacturer would. More importantly, in cases where 
consumers figure things out for themselves, exposure to minor 
confusion will probably improve consumer abilities, leading to less 
confusion and a better-functioning trademark system over the long 
run. Whenever a consumer encounters confusion and successfully 
overcomes it, her System 2 has come to the aid of System 1 by 
creating a strategy for getting the information the consumer needs. 
Over time, System 1 learns to execute the strategies created by 
System 2 automatically, making the consumer more astute when 
encountering similar marks. Accordingly, it seems likely that the 
benefits of exposing consumers to low levels of confusion outweigh 
the modest and speculative harm that this confusion may cause. 
The confusion that persists in our trademark system and the 
associated benefits suggest that trademark law already implements 
the balance proposed here in many important areas.287 In other areas, 
however, trademark law seems to have paid insufficient attention to 
the relationship between this balance and the proper functioning of 
our trademark system. These areas offer meaningful opportunities for 
reform. 
Consider the cases in which courts base infringement on a 
plausible but somewhat speculative possibility of confusion.288 
Trademark convention states that these decisions improve our 
trademark system by making it even easier for consumers to avoid 
confusion.289 Perhaps most consumers can tell the difference between 
Beer Nuts and Brew Nuts,290 but a few consumers will have difficulty 
doing so, and it makes conventional sense to follow the eradicate 
confusion norm because that norm will reduce the overall number of 
confused consumers. 
The benefits of exposing consumers to modest confusion suggest 
that cases like Brew Nuts were wrongly decided. Over the long run, 
there is reason to doubt whether preventing modest confusion of the 
sort created by the simultaneous use of “Beer Nuts” and “Brew Nuts” 
really helps markets function more effectively. In situations where 
two marks can be distinguished with a modest amount of attention, 
 
 287. See supra Parts II–III. 
 288. See supra notes 84–114 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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consumers are quite adaptable. They can easily learn that Beer Nuts 
and Brew Nuts are similar products made by different producers, or 
they can learn that there is only one maker of nuts whose name refers 
to beer. The specific lesson learned greatly affects how consumers 
behave, especially when reinforced by other cases with similar results.  
If consumers learn that the difference between “Beer Nuts” and 
“Brew Nuts” has no commercial significance, they will learn to ignore 
that difference and others like it. This eventually will make consumers 
relatively insensitive to easily perceptible differences between marks, 
and this insensitivity will render consumers susceptible to becoming 
confused whenever they see marks that evoke similar associations. By 
contrast, if consumers learn that Beer Nuts and Brew Nuts are 
different, they will learn that modest differences between marks 
matter. If trademark law consistently reinforces this lesson in similar 
cases, consumers will become sensitive to this degree of difference 
and will become less susceptible to confusion in the future. This 
sensitivity will improve the operation of markets in two ways. 
First, more information will flow through the trademark system. 
If consumers learn that “Beer Nuts” and “Brew Nuts” are effectively 
identical, then trademark law will prevent competitors of Beer Nuts 
from calling their products “Brew Nuts” or any other similar name. 
This protection makes it hard for more than one nut producer to 
quickly inform consumers that its nuts go well with beer. It increases 
the risk that consumers will not know valuable information about the 
products they buy, hampering the prompt satisfaction of consumer 
preferences. Conversely, if consumers learn to differentiate between 
marks like “Beer Nuts” and those like “Brew Nuts,” then trademark 
law has no reason to intervene because consumer confusion will not 
exist. This allows many rival producers to use “Beer Nuts,” “Brew 
Nuts,” “Lager Nuts,” or any other reference that informs consumers 
that their nuts go well with beer. This association provides valuable 
information to consumers and improves the operation of markets 
because consumers can more easily understand the nature of products 
they encounter. 
Second, markets will avoid the confusion and disruption that 
accompany trademark judgments. As noted earlier, any finding of 
trademark infringement both reduces and creates consumer 
confusion.291 Some consumers will have no trouble distinguishing 
“Beer Nuts” from “Brew Nuts,” and some of those consumers will 
 
 291. See supra notes 166–75 and accompanying text. 
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look for “Brew Nuts” as their preferred brand of nuts. If a court finds 
the use of “Brew Nuts” infringing, the losing defendant must stop 
using the mark and rebrand its products. Those consumers who 
preferred “Brew Nuts” will be frustrated because they cannot use 
“Brew Nuts” to find the product they want to buy. Indeed, they will 
remain confused until they discover and learn whatever new mark the 
maker of “Brew Nuts” decides to use on its product. However, if 
trademark law teaches consumers to distinguish between marks like 
“Beer Nuts” and “Brew Nuts,” the incidence of trademark 
infringement will fall. This reduction will lower the amount of forced 
rebranding, allowing consumers who prefer “Brew Nuts” to continue 
buying their desired product without disruption. The market will 
therefore operate more smoothly because consumers can immediately 
satisfy their preferences. 
Similar observations can be made about cases where aggressive 
interpretations of confusion have been used to prevent satirical 
depictions of trademarks. For example, in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
Balducci Publications,292 the plaintiff, Anheuser-Busch, sued the 
defendant, Balducci, over a fake advertisement that appeared on the 
back cover of Balducci’s humor magazine, Snicker.293 The fake 
advertisement purported to promote a beer called “Michelob Oily,” 
and it was intended to make a sly reference to an oil spill in the 
Gasconade River—a source for the water used in Anheuser-Busch’s 
beer.294 To support its claim, the plaintiff introduced the results of a 
survey indicating that consumers did not recognize that Balducci’s 
work was a humorous fake.295 Slightly over half of the survey 
respondents thought that Balducci needed Anheuser-Busch’s 
permission to use its logos and trademarks.296 Six percent thought the 
advertisement was authentic.297 Nevertheless, the district court 
rejected Anheuser-Busch’s claim and found that no infringement 
existed.298 However, the Eighth Circuit reversed.299 
Leaving aside the significant problems about reliability and 
objectivity that plague surveys prepared for litigation, the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision makes sense only under a very expansive view of 
 
 292. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 293. Id. at 771–72. 
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confusion. It may be appropriate for trademark law to shield 
consumers from indistinguishable fakes, but here consumers did not 
generally accept the defendant’s advertisement as authentic because 
only six percent of the survey responses reflected this kind of 
confusion. Granted, the finding of infringement against Balducci 
protected a small number of consumers from confusion, but it is not 
at all clear that doing so benefitted our trademark system. 
The very premise of parodies and satires like Balducci’s is the 
point driven home by the viewer’s recognition of the fake as 
resembling the original. The viewer of the advertisement briefly 
entertains the possibility that he is looking at an original, but then 
figures out that it is a fake conveying a humorous message about the 
original. This process means that every parody operates on a form of 
confusion that trademark law arguably should remedy. However, if 
trademark law remedies this confusion, it will become very difficult to 
create effective parodies and satires because the necessary moment of 
confusion will become evidence of trademark infringement. Once the 
trademark system makes this change, fewer and fewer parodies and 
satires will be published, and consumers will have fewer and fewer 
reasons to develop, use, or maintain the cognitive skills that enable 
their identification and appreciation of parodies. This will make 
consumers even more prone to confusion, and over time the art form 
will wither because the law prohibits producing it. Instead, if courts 
permit the publication of fake advertisements like Balducci’s, a few 
consumers will surely face immediate confusion. However, consumers 
will also eventually develop the ability to recognize parodies and 
satires, making them less prone to confusion in the future. This will 
improve the operation of our trademark system by increasing the 
amount of information available to consumers. 
Of course, like all challenges to convention, the proposal made 
here will meet objections. In particular, defenders of the eradicate 
confusion norm will likely make two claims. First, they may argue that 
consumers will not meaningfully adapt to confusion because they are 
permanently susceptible to confusion. Time pressure, boredom, and 
low involvement are permanent features of marketplaces that distract 
consumers from the potentially meaningful features of trademarks. 
Second, they may claim that the costs of any present confusion and 
concomitant consumer adaptation outweigh any benefits that may be 
gained. I think that both of these arguments are plausible but 
insufficiently persuasive to truly support the eradicate confusion 
norm. 
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I agree that consumers frequently do not pay full attention when 
shopping, but this lack of attention does not mean that consumers 
cannot improve the skills they use when they are not paying full 
attention. Consumer shopping behavior develops because it generates 
results that consumers deem acceptable given their level of interest 
and other constraints. If we allow consumers to occasionally face a 
surprise, they will learn and adopt strategies that produce better 
results. More important, the adaptations become automatic over time, 
eventually becoming skills that can be executed routinely while 
distracted. Indeed, this adaption is precisely what has happened in the 
cases of marks that lack inherent distinctiveness and private-label 
goods.300 
Furthermore, although there are costs associated with exposing 
consumers to confusion, those costs have modest effects on the 
operation of markets and are very much worth incurring. Remember, 
a great deal of consumer learning happens during day-to-day 
activities.301 As long as the confusion encountered is reasonable, 
consumers may buy the wrong products or have mistaken impressions 
for a short while, but they will not make these errors for long. One 
could take the position that the entire point of trademarks are to 
relieve consumers of this very burden and that eliminating confusion 
makes our trademark system work better. However, this argument is 
shortsighted because it forgets that our trademark system’s ability to 
convey information is determined by the skills of the consumers who 
participate in markets, and it is a good idea to have skilled, perceptive 
consumers. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have identified the conventional wisdom that 
trademark law exists to eradicate consumer confusion. I have further 
argued that this goal rests on an incorrect understanding of the 
relationship between consumer confusion and the effective 
functioning of our trademark system. 
Trademark convention embraces the elimination of confusion 
because it wrongly believes that confusion has no constructive role to 
play in our trademark system. It may be tempting to shield consumers 
from all confusion in order to make their lives as easy as possible but 
doing so is surely a mistake. Consumers cannot learn to identify and 
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distinguish between trademarks without occasional exposure to 
confusion. Shielding consumers from all confusion deprives 
consumers of the very skills needed to function in modern markets. A 
trademark system that truly eliminated all confusion would therefore 
make consumers’ lives harder, not easier. This insight enabled the 
identification of many instances in which trademark law has pursued 
the elimination of confusion too aggressively, at least in part because 
trademark convention blinds courts to the constructive benefits of 
modest confusion. All of this leads to the conclusion that confusion 
has an important and constructive role to play in our trademark 
system. 
It is my hope that this insight will affect the future of trademark 
in two ways. First, a new understanding about the effects of confusion 
opens up opportunities for future scholarship. Perhaps psychologists 
and educators can help us determine whether consumers are 
particularly likely or unlikely to learn from certain forms of 
confusion. Empirical work may also be possible to determine the 
extent to which consumers exposed to confusion acquire stronger 
cognitive skills. 
Second, and more importantly, courts will hopefully recognize 
the importance of confusion and change the way they understand and 
interpret trademark law. Doing so may initially confuse consumers 
who are presently inattentive and harm the commercial interests of 
those who own trademarks. Over the long run, however, all of society 
will benefit because consumers with improved cognitive skills can 
better navigate modern markets in ways that support the 
sophisticated and constructive use of trademarks. 
